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Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsIt's a 74 tweet thread. You have to Google translate each tweet.
But it's as good an analysis of recent events in Ukraine as I have read.
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It's a 74 tweet thread. You have to Google translate each tweet. (Original Post)
Tomconroy
Jun 2022
OP
Princess Turandot
(4,787 posts)1. Here's the text. However, it doesn't include the images/maps etc
The Russian army took Severodonetsk. Why are the Russian units moving forward again? Ukraine lost? I will try to analyze the new tactics of Putin's army, which helps it achieve local victories. My thoughts are in a new thread. ⬇️ #UkraineRussiaWar
Image
1. After a series of failures in the spring, having suffered significant losses, the Russian army has noticeably changed its tactics of warfare. By adapting it to your new goals, using your strengths and trying to level out your weaknesses. And also adjust to the actions of the Ukrainian army.
2. In this thread, I will first outline the main conclusions and my thoughts about the actions of the Russian army, and then I will analyze each item and justify it. I will also add the necessary details. First a brief summary, then an in-depth analysis.
Begin:
3. How have the goals of growing the army changed?
It was: Change of power in Ukraine
Now: Force Zelensky to accept peace on Putin's terms
Was: Take control of the country
Now: Capture Lugansk and Donetsk regions
Was: Defeat the Ukrainian army
Now: Force the Ukrainian army to retreat
Image
4. In accordance with the goals, tactics have also changed. Instead of wide maneuvers, we see local attacks. Instead of encircling enemy groupings, the tactics of "pushing out" the enemy from key areas. Instead of focusing on mobile units - the widespread reliance on artillery as the key to success.
5. The sequence of actions of Putin's army is as follows:
1. Create pressure on a key area
2. Ensure superiority of forces in the area
3. Start bypass movements on the flanks
4. Having created a half ring, conduct a massive assault
5. Having occupied the area, strengthen there
6. Offensive operations of the Russian troops became:
1. Slow and methodical
2. Cautious, with minimal risk
3. Local. The area of operations is close to the range of cannon artillery (15-20 km)
4. Thoroughly prepared
We did not see all this in February and March
7. The growing army bites off the territory in small pieces. This "eat the pie in pieces" tactic is ineffective in a protracted war. The key to success is the defeat of the enemy army over a large area. But in the short term, this approach brings results to those who have more resources.
8. Ros army solves political, not military tasks. The first is to give Putin a real victory. The capture of first the Lugansk and then the Donetsk regions of Ukraine was chosen as such a victory. The second is not to lose too much and not suffer embarrassing defeats. These tasks defined a new style of war
Image
9. So they attacked Severodonetsk, surrounded on three sides. The Zolote area was also attacked in a similar way (I will analyze it in detail later). The main effort still remains a frontal assault. From a command point of view, assault reduces risk and gives you much more control over the local situation.
10. It is important to understand. Now the Russian army wants to seize the territory. Not to defeat the Ukrainians, but to drive them away - to squeeze them out of important areas. Because Putin is not interested in what is happening with military operations. He obviously demands the capture and occupation of Ukrainian land.
Image
11. As a result, we see a series of short-term local offensives followed by assaults on key points. And this will continue until the Ukrainian army stops them or the Russian units run out of strength.
12. And now about everything in more detail and in order. Let's go back to April, when the Russian army concentrated on the Eastern Front. It was at that moment that the goals that Putin set for the generals changed dramatically. This is the plan that appears to have been approved.
Image
13. The Russian command realized its main weakness - the insufficient number of troops. It was in April that the loudest talk was about a possible mobilization, because the shortage of troops was obvious. But instead of increasing the army, it was decided to reduce the targets.
Image
14. Then Putin's officials started talking about the fact that the main thing was the capture of Donbass, and after the transfer of troops, it became clear that this was the case. The main Russian groups left for Izyum and the territory of the occupied LDNR. At the same time, negotiations ended.
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15. The subsequent offensive to the south from Izyum was the last attempt by the growing army to create a wide encirclement and encircle a large grouping of Ukrainian troops. But it proceeded sluggishly, and apparently soon the Russian generals abandoned this idea.
Image
16. Moreover, the first plan was not the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, not a military victory, but the “liberation”, as Putin’s propaganda says, of the remnants of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. That is, it became enough to force the Ukrainian troops to leave. How to do it? Using the main trump card. ⬇️
17. The Russian army gained experience and tried to level out its shortcomings - low numbers and unprofessionalism. And to conduct combat operations with an emphasis on strengths - air superiority and dominant superiority in artillery. Under this was adjusted tactics.
Image
18. Personnel changes also point to this. Putin has changed commanders twice since the beginning of April. And both times the posts go to "Syrian" generals. Those who have experience in restoring order, massive bombardments of cities and squeezing out the enemy with the seizure of territory.
19. From April to the end of June, I see the Russian offensive as a chain of local operations. I got the following list (part 1):
1 Offensive from Izyum
2 Advance towards Belogorovka
3 Assault on Rubizhne
4 Assault on Popasna
5 Forcing the Seversky Donets near Belogorovka
Image
20. The second part of the list of operations:
6 Advance from Popasna
7 Assault Liman
8 Storming of Severodonetsk
9 Assault on Svyatogorsk
10 Attack on Svetlodarsk
11 Surrounding the Golden
Image
21. All these operations took place in areas with a radius of 10-20 km, most often these were assaults on settlements from several directions. All these operations followed the same scenario:
22. The Russian army gathered in one place the overwhelming number of artillery and brought up the best infantry forces for the attack. Then the area was shelled until the Ukrainians left it. Then the growing parts slowly moved in there. The offensive went on for 3-5 days, then the units stopped
23. According to various sources, the advantage of growing the army in artillery is in the range from 1:10 to 1:20. Pay attention to this material, it will talk about how wasteful artillery can be growing, shooting even at single soldiers.
Artillery Ping-Pong. New Yorker report on the war of attrition in the Donbass
Mediazona continues to publish in Russian a series of reports by New Yorker correspondent Joshua Yaffa from U...
https://zona.media/article/2022/06/19/attrition
23. The Wagner PMC and the remaining paratroopers became the spearhead of Putin's offensive operations. Which are regularly transported from one zone to another. Where a lot of infantry is needed, the troops of the DPR and LPR are used. Recently, they are no longer enough, but more on that later.
24. Let's look at the encirclement of Zolote as an example of the new tactics of growing the army. In general, Zolote was attacked from the first days - it is located on the original line of demarcation. But rare attacks did not bring success.
Image
25. By the beginning of April, the growing army advanced from the terrorist LPR to Nizhny and Toshkovka. And from the east - to Popasna. Gold gradually turned out to be in a semicircle. At that time, it covered the flank of the group defending Popasnaya.
Image
26. End of April. Taken Novotoshkovskoe. Very gradually, the army was growing, moving the front and occupying one small settlement after another.
Image
27. Seventh of May. Ukrainian troops leave Popasna, positions in which it became impossible to defend under massive shelling of growing artillery. Ros army occupies Popasnaya and the dominant height. Ukrainians are strengthening in Kamyshevakh. The rest of the positions are saved.
Image
28. For a whole week the army was growing, preparing a new offensive from Popasnaya and attacking mainly Kamyshevakha. But all attacks are repulsed. By May 15, the Lower was taken, there are advances in the Zolote area. But the region as a whole remains with the Ukrainians
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29. The offensive from Popasna begins on 18 May and reaches its peak by 24 May. By May 26, battles are going on for Kamyshevakha, it passes from hand to hand, attacks of Vrubovka begin. To the east of Zolotoy there is a small offensive towards Gorsky. And they still can't take Toshkovka. She is bypassed
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30. June begins. The troops are taking Kamyshevakha, there are battles for Vrubovka, they are regularly attacking Toshkovka and Zolote, propaganda is growing that they have either already been taken or are about to be taken.
Image
31. If we rewind to June 15, we will see that nothing has changed. The answer is simple - all forces are involved in the assault on Severodonetsk, some are advancing on Bakhmut, others - from Izyum to Slavyansk.
Image
32. By June 18, Severodonetsk was taken almost completely, the Azot plant was blocked. Forces were again transferred to the Zolote area and by June 20 a massive attack on Mirnaya Dolina followed. She was taken almost immediately, as was Toshkovka, who stood in the way. The final battle for Zolote is approaching.
Image
33. By June 22-23, everything was over. Ukrainian troops partially retreated, partially surrounded. The battle for this small area continued in its active phase from the beginning of April to the end of June, approximately 82-83 days.
Image
34. Pay attention to how the offensives of the growing army developed. 1. They concentrated on taking settlements. 2. The attacks actively continued for 2-3 days, then less intense fighting and the accumulation of forces. 3. Attacks took place when forces were not needed in other sectors of the front.
35. Some will call such tactics effective. I see it as an attempt to mask the general weakness of the Russian army. Literally one detail. Everything that I stifled here in 11 tweets took place on a square of 20 km, the maximum advance of the growing troops also turned out to be about 20 km. For 83 days!
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36. An interesting detail that will tell us about the weakness of the Russian army. Recall the offensive from Popasna. Then many wrote that the Severodonetsk grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was about to be surrounded. And I wrote in the thread that this is unlikely or will not happen soon.
Unroll available on Thread Reader
37. Why did the growing army refuse such a movement to immediately cut off most of the Ukrainian troops and leave them without supplies? And instead, she switched to a frontal assault on Severodonetsk and attacks on Vrubovka, Toshkovka and Zolote?
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38. To do this, you need to figure out how the offensive goes and what forces are needed to create such a ring. You need to understand that you cannot just walk a certain distance and that's it - your territory. She needs to be controlled. Namely, to defend against possible enemy counterattacks.
39. For defense, you need to take positions, dig trenches, dig in equipment, equip communications and everything else. As long as the soldiers do this, they cannot advance anywhere. Therefore, there is such a section of the charter as "company / battalion / regiment in attack", well, there is a similar one about defense, of course.
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40. Now in the army of the Russian Federation BTG are actively used - Battalion tactical groups. They are not exactly equal to the battalion, but are close in composition. This means that they can act in a similar way in defense. According to the Soviet-Russian system, the battalion in defense occupies a strip 5 km wide.
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41. This width depends on how far the battalion can shoot. Just 2-2.5 kilometers is effective tank shooting. Yes, armored personnel carriers are reinforced by artillery, but artillery cannot give the control that small arms give. Leaving large gaps between battalions is dangerous.
Image
42. And so, it turns out that for every 5 km of the front there should be one BTGr. Let's return to that very theoretical environment of Severodonetsk. Let's estimate how many armored personnel carriers would be needed to defend the closed ring. We take into account that we will have to defend from two sides
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43. From one Belogorovka to another (do not ask) about 20 kilometers. So you need 20/5*2 = 8 BTGr. + 1 BTGr to attack and at least one in reserve, what if the front fails somewhere? That is, a minimum of 10 BTG only to complete the ring, taking into account weak resistance
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44. But there is still the rest of the front, defending armored personnel carriers are also needed there. I figured that around Popasnaya, even without further advance, another 7-8 armored personnel carriers should have defended. That is, only up to 17-20 BTG, subject to complete success. For defense only.
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45. And of course you will ask. So, stop, but there are not only BTGrs, there are also various LPR-DPR troops, PMCs and others. So it is. But when you are advancing quickly, you can only rely on your grouping. How to entrust heterogeneous forces to build a fast and reliable defense?
46. Another question is how to supply them all? In addition, according to experts, the Russian army is experiencing a serious shortage of personnel in its armored personnel carriers. They should be larger than a battalion (900 men), but in reality they can be barely larger than a company (200 men). More:
Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military's Ill-Fated Force Design - War on the Rocks
Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a deeply flawed military operation, from Moscow's assumptions about an easy victory, to a lack of preparation, poor
https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/
47. For defense, personnel are extremely important. A tank will not dig a trench for itself. Arta will not drag a shell for herself. If no one covers the BMP from machine guns, such an BMP will not live for a long time. Therefore, the shortage of units primarily affects the defensive qualities of the growing army.
48. It seems illogical, according to military rules, personnel are more important for attack than for defense. But as I wrote above, the growing army corrected this through tactics. A lot of artillery shelling on stationary positions makes a massive assault unnecessary. Can attack in small groups
49. Defending in small groups will not work. At least because two eyes are not four. You look to the left, and on the right, the Ukrainian DRG has already passed on a buggy. Again, it is necessary to stand on guard, and cook food, and cut logs for positions. We need hands, but we don't have them.
50. The attack speed of the growing army greatly reduces losses in armored vehicles. As soon as something on tracks or wheels leaves for the front, a Ukrainian with a Javelin meets him. Either with the Stugna, or with the NLAW... The huge losses of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles make the growing army use them more carefully.
51. And also to bring more and more old equipment from warehouses. Including the very old T-62. According to my information, they were used not only on the Kherson and Zaporozhye fronts for defense. But also in the Vrubovka area - in the hottest place.
52. If there are no armored vehicles, then the infantry cannot go forward for a long time. It is necessary to move artillery fire to the second and third lines of defense, as if during the First World War. And then the soldiers get completely tired, losses accumulate, ammunition runs out.
53. This is why the Russian army attacks slowly. To have enough time and energy to build a defense of the captured patches of land. To gradually build up supply without causing an overload of the weak logistics network. In order to have time to pull up artillery in the end.
54. I do not expect mobile warfare from the Russian army at this stage. It is unprofitable for them, on the contrary, the slow extrusion and assault of individual villages leads to success. Yes, the victories are small and limited, but there are no other results, and even they look significant in the end.
55. What is happening now? It is reported that the Ukrainian units left the industrial zone of Severodonetsk. Obviously, the next local offensive of Putin's army will be the assault on Lisichansk. In the same style - creating a half ring and artillery hell.
Image
56. The goal of the growing army is to reach the borders of the Lugansk region, and most likely in the short term they can achieve this. And the Ukrainians will retreat to the new defensive line Bakhmut - Soledar - Seversk.
Image
57. At the same time, Slavyansk became the second area for the local offensive of the growing army. Probably the growing army will build bridges across the Seversky Donets and try to attack from two sides.
Image
58. But why could an army grow at all? I have already named one reason - the change of tactics to a more convenient one. The second reason is the weakening of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainians are also losing equipment, and Western weapons are arriving with delays.
59. April deliveries put everyone (including me) in an optimistic mood. But then May followed, when almost nothing of the heavy weapons was sent. And only now new howitzers and self-propelled guns began to arrive. Including MLRS HIMARS.
60. In the meantime, the Ukrainians used up almost all their shells for Soviet 152-mm guns and long-range Soviet MLRS Smerch / Uragan. And it's almost impossible to get new ones. Which further weakened the Ukrainian artillery.
61. The third reason is that the Russian army has established a flow of volunteers to the front, partially covering the losses. We see this, including from open data on losses. The number of volunteers has sharply increased in them. While the figure is not critical, but it must be multiplied by at least 3.
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62. Moreover, the BBC writes that the Russian authorities are preparing a law according to which it will be possible to sign a contract immediately after school. Now you can go to contract service after being drafted into the army. That is, they are literally going to send schoolchildren to war:
The Russian army will take contract soldiers immediately after school. State Duma changes law - BBC News
For the first time, yesterday's schoolchildren, including those who did not serve on conscription, will be able to officially replenish the Russian army fighting in Ukraine for the first time, the BBC found out. Such an amendment to the law was recommended to be adopted on June 8 by Mr.
https://bbc.global.ssl.fastly.net/russian/news-61712941
63. Let's get to the fun part. How can Ukraine resist Putin's offensive? Are there any chances and what do I see them in? And also why I stand firm in my opinion - Putin's Russia has already lost the war.
64. The Ukrainian army can hit the strong side of the growing army - artillery. And try to reduce the Russian advantage here. For this, long-range howitzers Pzh 2000 and Cesar are needed. As well as the American HIMARS. To get the rose long-range guns
65. But fighting against growing artillery is a long and difficult task, because there are stupidly a lot of it. And Western supplies are few. It will take several months to achieve parity. There is another way. You can hit in a weak spot - so that the army grows, it cannot use its advantage 100%
66. Namely, logistics. Taking out ammunition depots. What the Ukrainian artillery is already doing quite successfully. Recently, I have heard about 4 or 5 powerful explosions of Putin's army depots on the Zaporozhye front and in the Donbass.
67. Another weak point of Putin's army is personnel, infantry. By destroying soldiers, especially experienced ones, you can bleed the army so much that it will not be able to advance anywhere. And in the future, even defend. Without cover, artillery, and especially its communications, will be at risk.
68. In many respects, this is now being done by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, drawing the growing army into the struggle for Kherson. I already wrote that the offensive here is the most promising. Yes, the Ukrainians were unable to muster a lot of forces, so the offensive is local. But it is still useful, as it distracts the growing army from the Donbass.
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69. Additional forces have to be transferred to Kherson, reducing reserves on the Eastern Front. But besides this, a purposeful struggle is also needed with Putin's infantry units. Such as the attack on the barracks of PMC Wagner in Kadievka
70. In addition, the Ukrainian army needs to break Russian tactics. Since Putin's units do not want a maneuver war, it must be imposed. All in the same place near Kherson or on the Zaporozhye front, which are clearly secondary for Putin's army.
71. It is clear that all this is very difficult and even a little like a dream. However, the Ukrainian military is already advancing on Kherson, even with small forces, and they are succeeding. So why should we exclude the possibility of further success? Let's see.
72. Putin definitely lost this war. Yes, as long as the offensive continues and my opinion about the turning point was premature. However, let's look at the overall map again. Movements of 10-20 km in months do not change the picture.
Image
73. At the same time, Putin's army is losing personnel. Including experienced mercenaries. And they are replaced by inexperienced volunteers 40+ and, in the future, by schoolchildren. At some point, the inexperience of the personnel will become critical
74. Everyone agrees that the Ukrainian army is inferior to the Russian one in terms of technology. For artillery dozens of times. But if the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already fighting the growing army on an equal footing, then what will happen when they receive more modern heavy weapons? It seems that the triumphal arch will not be useful to Putin.
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1. After a series of failures in the spring, having suffered significant losses, the Russian army has noticeably changed its tactics of warfare. By adapting it to your new goals, using your strengths and trying to level out your weaknesses. And also adjust to the actions of the Ukrainian army.
2. In this thread, I will first outline the main conclusions and my thoughts about the actions of the Russian army, and then I will analyze each item and justify it. I will also add the necessary details. First a brief summary, then an in-depth analysis.
Begin:
3. How have the goals of growing the army changed?
It was: Change of power in Ukraine
Now: Force Zelensky to accept peace on Putin's terms
Was: Take control of the country
Now: Capture Lugansk and Donetsk regions
Was: Defeat the Ukrainian army
Now: Force the Ukrainian army to retreat
Image
4. In accordance with the goals, tactics have also changed. Instead of wide maneuvers, we see local attacks. Instead of encircling enemy groupings, the tactics of "pushing out" the enemy from key areas. Instead of focusing on mobile units - the widespread reliance on artillery as the key to success.
5. The sequence of actions of Putin's army is as follows:
1. Create pressure on a key area
2. Ensure superiority of forces in the area
3. Start bypass movements on the flanks
4. Having created a half ring, conduct a massive assault
5. Having occupied the area, strengthen there
6. Offensive operations of the Russian troops became:
1. Slow and methodical
2. Cautious, with minimal risk
3. Local. The area of operations is close to the range of cannon artillery (15-20 km)
4. Thoroughly prepared
We did not see all this in February and March
7. The growing army bites off the territory in small pieces. This "eat the pie in pieces" tactic is ineffective in a protracted war. The key to success is the defeat of the enemy army over a large area. But in the short term, this approach brings results to those who have more resources.
8. Ros army solves political, not military tasks. The first is to give Putin a real victory. The capture of first the Lugansk and then the Donetsk regions of Ukraine was chosen as such a victory. The second is not to lose too much and not suffer embarrassing defeats. These tasks defined a new style of war
Image
9. So they attacked Severodonetsk, surrounded on three sides. The Zolote area was also attacked in a similar way (I will analyze it in detail later). The main effort still remains a frontal assault. From a command point of view, assault reduces risk and gives you much more control over the local situation.
10. It is important to understand. Now the Russian army wants to seize the territory. Not to defeat the Ukrainians, but to drive them away - to squeeze them out of important areas. Because Putin is not interested in what is happening with military operations. He obviously demands the capture and occupation of Ukrainian land.
Image
11. As a result, we see a series of short-term local offensives followed by assaults on key points. And this will continue until the Ukrainian army stops them or the Russian units run out of strength.
12. And now about everything in more detail and in order. Let's go back to April, when the Russian army concentrated on the Eastern Front. It was at that moment that the goals that Putin set for the generals changed dramatically. This is the plan that appears to have been approved.
Image
13. The Russian command realized its main weakness - the insufficient number of troops. It was in April that the loudest talk was about a possible mobilization, because the shortage of troops was obvious. But instead of increasing the army, it was decided to reduce the targets.
Image
14. Then Putin's officials started talking about the fact that the main thing was the capture of Donbass, and after the transfer of troops, it became clear that this was the case. The main Russian groups left for Izyum and the territory of the occupied LDNR. At the same time, negotiations ended.
Image
15. The subsequent offensive to the south from Izyum was the last attempt by the growing army to create a wide encirclement and encircle a large grouping of Ukrainian troops. But it proceeded sluggishly, and apparently soon the Russian generals abandoned this idea.
Image
16. Moreover, the first plan was not the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, not a military victory, but the “liberation”, as Putin’s propaganda says, of the remnants of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. That is, it became enough to force the Ukrainian troops to leave. How to do it? Using the main trump card. ⬇️
17. The Russian army gained experience and tried to level out its shortcomings - low numbers and unprofessionalism. And to conduct combat operations with an emphasis on strengths - air superiority and dominant superiority in artillery. Under this was adjusted tactics.
Image
18. Personnel changes also point to this. Putin has changed commanders twice since the beginning of April. And both times the posts go to "Syrian" generals. Those who have experience in restoring order, massive bombardments of cities and squeezing out the enemy with the seizure of territory.
19. From April to the end of June, I see the Russian offensive as a chain of local operations. I got the following list (part 1):
1 Offensive from Izyum
2 Advance towards Belogorovka
3 Assault on Rubizhne
4 Assault on Popasna
5 Forcing the Seversky Donets near Belogorovka
Image
20. The second part of the list of operations:
6 Advance from Popasna
7 Assault Liman
8 Storming of Severodonetsk
9 Assault on Svyatogorsk
10 Attack on Svetlodarsk
11 Surrounding the Golden
Image
21. All these operations took place in areas with a radius of 10-20 km, most often these were assaults on settlements from several directions. All these operations followed the same scenario:
22. The Russian army gathered in one place the overwhelming number of artillery and brought up the best infantry forces for the attack. Then the area was shelled until the Ukrainians left it. Then the growing parts slowly moved in there. The offensive went on for 3-5 days, then the units stopped
23. According to various sources, the advantage of growing the army in artillery is in the range from 1:10 to 1:20. Pay attention to this material, it will talk about how wasteful artillery can be growing, shooting even at single soldiers.
Artillery Ping-Pong. New Yorker report on the war of attrition in the Donbass
Mediazona continues to publish in Russian a series of reports by New Yorker correspondent Joshua Yaffa from U...
https://zona.media/article/2022/06/19/attrition
23. The Wagner PMC and the remaining paratroopers became the spearhead of Putin's offensive operations. Which are regularly transported from one zone to another. Where a lot of infantry is needed, the troops of the DPR and LPR are used. Recently, they are no longer enough, but more on that later.
24. Let's look at the encirclement of Zolote as an example of the new tactics of growing the army. In general, Zolote was attacked from the first days - it is located on the original line of demarcation. But rare attacks did not bring success.
Image
25. By the beginning of April, the growing army advanced from the terrorist LPR to Nizhny and Toshkovka. And from the east - to Popasna. Gold gradually turned out to be in a semicircle. At that time, it covered the flank of the group defending Popasnaya.
Image
26. End of April. Taken Novotoshkovskoe. Very gradually, the army was growing, moving the front and occupying one small settlement after another.
Image
27. Seventh of May. Ukrainian troops leave Popasna, positions in which it became impossible to defend under massive shelling of growing artillery. Ros army occupies Popasnaya and the dominant height. Ukrainians are strengthening in Kamyshevakh. The rest of the positions are saved.
Image
28. For a whole week the army was growing, preparing a new offensive from Popasnaya and attacking mainly Kamyshevakha. But all attacks are repulsed. By May 15, the Lower was taken, there are advances in the Zolote area. But the region as a whole remains with the Ukrainians
Image
29. The offensive from Popasna begins on 18 May and reaches its peak by 24 May. By May 26, battles are going on for Kamyshevakha, it passes from hand to hand, attacks of Vrubovka begin. To the east of Zolotoy there is a small offensive towards Gorsky. And they still can't take Toshkovka. She is bypassed
Image
30. June begins. The troops are taking Kamyshevakha, there are battles for Vrubovka, they are regularly attacking Toshkovka and Zolote, propaganda is growing that they have either already been taken or are about to be taken.
Image
31. If we rewind to June 15, we will see that nothing has changed. The answer is simple - all forces are involved in the assault on Severodonetsk, some are advancing on Bakhmut, others - from Izyum to Slavyansk.
Image
32. By June 18, Severodonetsk was taken almost completely, the Azot plant was blocked. Forces were again transferred to the Zolote area and by June 20 a massive attack on Mirnaya Dolina followed. She was taken almost immediately, as was Toshkovka, who stood in the way. The final battle for Zolote is approaching.
Image
33. By June 22-23, everything was over. Ukrainian troops partially retreated, partially surrounded. The battle for this small area continued in its active phase from the beginning of April to the end of June, approximately 82-83 days.
Image
34. Pay attention to how the offensives of the growing army developed. 1. They concentrated on taking settlements. 2. The attacks actively continued for 2-3 days, then less intense fighting and the accumulation of forces. 3. Attacks took place when forces were not needed in other sectors of the front.
35. Some will call such tactics effective. I see it as an attempt to mask the general weakness of the Russian army. Literally one detail. Everything that I stifled here in 11 tweets took place on a square of 20 km, the maximum advance of the growing troops also turned out to be about 20 km. For 83 days!
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36. An interesting detail that will tell us about the weakness of the Russian army. Recall the offensive from Popasna. Then many wrote that the Severodonetsk grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was about to be surrounded. And I wrote in the thread that this is unlikely or will not happen soon.
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37. Why did the growing army refuse such a movement to immediately cut off most of the Ukrainian troops and leave them without supplies? And instead, she switched to a frontal assault on Severodonetsk and attacks on Vrubovka, Toshkovka and Zolote?
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38. To do this, you need to figure out how the offensive goes and what forces are needed to create such a ring. You need to understand that you cannot just walk a certain distance and that's it - your territory. She needs to be controlled. Namely, to defend against possible enemy counterattacks.
39. For defense, you need to take positions, dig trenches, dig in equipment, equip communications and everything else. As long as the soldiers do this, they cannot advance anywhere. Therefore, there is such a section of the charter as "company / battalion / regiment in attack", well, there is a similar one about defense, of course.
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40. Now in the army of the Russian Federation BTG are actively used - Battalion tactical groups. They are not exactly equal to the battalion, but are close in composition. This means that they can act in a similar way in defense. According to the Soviet-Russian system, the battalion in defense occupies a strip 5 km wide.
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41. This width depends on how far the battalion can shoot. Just 2-2.5 kilometers is effective tank shooting. Yes, armored personnel carriers are reinforced by artillery, but artillery cannot give the control that small arms give. Leaving large gaps between battalions is dangerous.
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42. And so, it turns out that for every 5 km of the front there should be one BTGr. Let's return to that very theoretical environment of Severodonetsk. Let's estimate how many armored personnel carriers would be needed to defend the closed ring. We take into account that we will have to defend from two sides
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43. From one Belogorovka to another (do not ask) about 20 kilometers. So you need 20/5*2 = 8 BTGr. + 1 BTGr to attack and at least one in reserve, what if the front fails somewhere? That is, a minimum of 10 BTG only to complete the ring, taking into account weak resistance
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44. But there is still the rest of the front, defending armored personnel carriers are also needed there. I figured that around Popasnaya, even without further advance, another 7-8 armored personnel carriers should have defended. That is, only up to 17-20 BTG, subject to complete success. For defense only.
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45. And of course you will ask. So, stop, but there are not only BTGrs, there are also various LPR-DPR troops, PMCs and others. So it is. But when you are advancing quickly, you can only rely on your grouping. How to entrust heterogeneous forces to build a fast and reliable defense?
46. Another question is how to supply them all? In addition, according to experts, the Russian army is experiencing a serious shortage of personnel in its armored personnel carriers. They should be larger than a battalion (900 men), but in reality they can be barely larger than a company (200 men). More:
Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military's Ill-Fated Force Design - War on the Rocks
Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a deeply flawed military operation, from Moscow's assumptions about an easy victory, to a lack of preparation, poor
https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/
47. For defense, personnel are extremely important. A tank will not dig a trench for itself. Arta will not drag a shell for herself. If no one covers the BMP from machine guns, such an BMP will not live for a long time. Therefore, the shortage of units primarily affects the defensive qualities of the growing army.
48. It seems illogical, according to military rules, personnel are more important for attack than for defense. But as I wrote above, the growing army corrected this through tactics. A lot of artillery shelling on stationary positions makes a massive assault unnecessary. Can attack in small groups
49. Defending in small groups will not work. At least because two eyes are not four. You look to the left, and on the right, the Ukrainian DRG has already passed on a buggy. Again, it is necessary to stand on guard, and cook food, and cut logs for positions. We need hands, but we don't have them.
50. The attack speed of the growing army greatly reduces losses in armored vehicles. As soon as something on tracks or wheels leaves for the front, a Ukrainian with a Javelin meets him. Either with the Stugna, or with the NLAW... The huge losses of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles make the growing army use them more carefully.
51. And also to bring more and more old equipment from warehouses. Including the very old T-62. According to my information, they were used not only on the Kherson and Zaporozhye fronts for defense. But also in the Vrubovka area - in the hottest place.
52. If there are no armored vehicles, then the infantry cannot go forward for a long time. It is necessary to move artillery fire to the second and third lines of defense, as if during the First World War. And then the soldiers get completely tired, losses accumulate, ammunition runs out.
53. This is why the Russian army attacks slowly. To have enough time and energy to build a defense of the captured patches of land. To gradually build up supply without causing an overload of the weak logistics network. In order to have time to pull up artillery in the end.
54. I do not expect mobile warfare from the Russian army at this stage. It is unprofitable for them, on the contrary, the slow extrusion and assault of individual villages leads to success. Yes, the victories are small and limited, but there are no other results, and even they look significant in the end.
55. What is happening now? It is reported that the Ukrainian units left the industrial zone of Severodonetsk. Obviously, the next local offensive of Putin's army will be the assault on Lisichansk. In the same style - creating a half ring and artillery hell.
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56. The goal of the growing army is to reach the borders of the Lugansk region, and most likely in the short term they can achieve this. And the Ukrainians will retreat to the new defensive line Bakhmut - Soledar - Seversk.
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57. At the same time, Slavyansk became the second area for the local offensive of the growing army. Probably the growing army will build bridges across the Seversky Donets and try to attack from two sides.
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58. But why could an army grow at all? I have already named one reason - the change of tactics to a more convenient one. The second reason is the weakening of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainians are also losing equipment, and Western weapons are arriving with delays.
59. April deliveries put everyone (including me) in an optimistic mood. But then May followed, when almost nothing of the heavy weapons was sent. And only now new howitzers and self-propelled guns began to arrive. Including MLRS HIMARS.
60. In the meantime, the Ukrainians used up almost all their shells for Soviet 152-mm guns and long-range Soviet MLRS Smerch / Uragan. And it's almost impossible to get new ones. Which further weakened the Ukrainian artillery.
61. The third reason is that the Russian army has established a flow of volunteers to the front, partially covering the losses. We see this, including from open data on losses. The number of volunteers has sharply increased in them. While the figure is not critical, but it must be multiplied by at least 3.
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62. Moreover, the BBC writes that the Russian authorities are preparing a law according to which it will be possible to sign a contract immediately after school. Now you can go to contract service after being drafted into the army. That is, they are literally going to send schoolchildren to war:
The Russian army will take contract soldiers immediately after school. State Duma changes law - BBC News
For the first time, yesterday's schoolchildren, including those who did not serve on conscription, will be able to officially replenish the Russian army fighting in Ukraine for the first time, the BBC found out. Such an amendment to the law was recommended to be adopted on June 8 by Mr.
https://bbc.global.ssl.fastly.net/russian/news-61712941
63. Let's get to the fun part. How can Ukraine resist Putin's offensive? Are there any chances and what do I see them in? And also why I stand firm in my opinion - Putin's Russia has already lost the war.
64. The Ukrainian army can hit the strong side of the growing army - artillery. And try to reduce the Russian advantage here. For this, long-range howitzers Pzh 2000 and Cesar are needed. As well as the American HIMARS. To get the rose long-range guns
65. But fighting against growing artillery is a long and difficult task, because there are stupidly a lot of it. And Western supplies are few. It will take several months to achieve parity. There is another way. You can hit in a weak spot - so that the army grows, it cannot use its advantage 100%
66. Namely, logistics. Taking out ammunition depots. What the Ukrainian artillery is already doing quite successfully. Recently, I have heard about 4 or 5 powerful explosions of Putin's army depots on the Zaporozhye front and in the Donbass.
67. Another weak point of Putin's army is personnel, infantry. By destroying soldiers, especially experienced ones, you can bleed the army so much that it will not be able to advance anywhere. And in the future, even defend. Without cover, artillery, and especially its communications, will be at risk.
68. In many respects, this is now being done by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, drawing the growing army into the struggle for Kherson. I already wrote that the offensive here is the most promising. Yes, the Ukrainians were unable to muster a lot of forces, so the offensive is local. But it is still useful, as it distracts the growing army from the Donbass.
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69. Additional forces have to be transferred to Kherson, reducing reserves on the Eastern Front. But besides this, a purposeful struggle is also needed with Putin's infantry units. Such as the attack on the barracks of PMC Wagner in Kadievka
70. In addition, the Ukrainian army needs to break Russian tactics. Since Putin's units do not want a maneuver war, it must be imposed. All in the same place near Kherson or on the Zaporozhye front, which are clearly secondary for Putin's army.
71. It is clear that all this is very difficult and even a little like a dream. However, the Ukrainian military is already advancing on Kherson, even with small forces, and they are succeeding. So why should we exclude the possibility of further success? Let's see.
72. Putin definitely lost this war. Yes, as long as the offensive continues and my opinion about the turning point was premature. However, let's look at the overall map again. Movements of 10-20 km in months do not change the picture.
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73. At the same time, Putin's army is losing personnel. Including experienced mercenaries. And they are replaced by inexperienced volunteers 40+ and, in the future, by schoolchildren. At some point, the inexperience of the personnel will become critical
74. Everyone agrees that the Ukrainian army is inferior to the Russian one in terms of technology. For artillery dozens of times. But if the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already fighting the growing army on an equal footing, then what will happen when they receive more modern heavy weapons? It seems that the triumphal arch will not be useful to Putin.
Tomconroy
(7,611 posts)2. TY. I wish I knew something about technology.
Princess Turandot
(4,787 posts)4. Are you familiar with the Thread Reader App?
I used that to unroll the thread, then asked Google Translate to translate the page.
This is the tweets' page, which I assume will show up in Russian. Once it's translated, you can see the images there as well as the text.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1540963832096608256.html
dweller
(23,639 posts)3. Is this the same fellow you followed early on ?
I think he had something to do with racing ?
I read several of his posts then
✌🏻
sprinkleeninow
(20,249 posts)5. "Western weapons are arriving with delays."
Damn, damn, damn.
Slava Ukraini! Slava Na Viki!
🕊🌻💙🇺🇦💛🌻🕊
Tomconroy
(7,611 posts)6. No heavy weapons in May. What an outrage.
sprinkleeninow
(20,249 posts)7. I simply have no understanding.
Measured responses were somewhat understandable early on, but now? What. How can countries that have the wherewithal seem to be stalling? Just allow the warmonger to plow through? Fratricide. Demonic.
niyad
(113,323 posts)8. Slava Ukraini! Thank you for the update.
Crunchy Frog
(26,587 posts)9. Thank you for posting.
The delays in heavy weaponry are inexplicable and engaging. So many more dead than needed to be.