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breaking - Tanya Chutkan says she will not recuse herself
Bwaaaaaaaaaaaah. 
28 replies
= new reply since forum marked as read
= new reply since forum marked as read
She's here to make short work of his nonsense. 
and welcome to DU😀😀 
all I saw was "Bwaaaaaaaaaaaah."
And I burst out laughing!
That's the best one-word OP I've ever read!
After all, it is the best medicine.
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67656604/61/united-states-v-trump/
p 7 of 20:
...
But justice also demands that judges not recuse without cause. “In the wrong hands, a
disqualification motion is a procedural weapon to harass opponents and delay proceedings. If
supported only by rumor, speculation, or innuendo, it is also a means to tarnish the reputation of
a federal judge.” Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 108. Motions for recusal could also be
wrongfully deployed as a form of “judge shopping,” Alberti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 600 F. Supp.
1024, 1025 (D.D.C. 1984), permitting “litigants or third parties to exercise a negative veto over
the assignment of judges,” In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981). There is,
accordingly, as much “obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when there is no occasion as
there is for him to do so when there is.” United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1312, 1325
(D.D.C. 1974) (quotation omitted), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Ehrlichman v. U.S., 431 U.S. 933, 97 (1977), reh’g
denied sub nom. Mitchell v. United States, 433 U.S. 916 (1977)...
disqualification motion is a procedural weapon to harass opponents and delay proceedings. If
supported only by rumor, speculation, or innuendo, it is also a means to tarnish the reputation of
a federal judge.” Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 108. Motions for recusal could also be
wrongfully deployed as a form of “judge shopping,” Alberti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 600 F. Supp.
1024, 1025 (D.D.C. 1984), permitting “litigants or third parties to exercise a negative veto over
the assignment of judges,” In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981). There is,
accordingly, as much “obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when there is no occasion as
there is for him to do so when there is.” United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1312, 1325
(D.D.C. 1974) (quotation omitted), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Ehrlichman v. U.S., 431 U.S. 933, 97 (1977), reh’g
denied sub nom. Mitchell v. United States, 433 U.S. 916 (1977)...
p 10 of 20:
The court’s “knowledge and the opinion it produced” with respect to who had and had not been prosecuted for crimes related to January 6 was “properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings” in Palmer and Priola,...
p 11 of 20:
... where the defendants argued that they were less culpable than those who had not been
prosecuted. Id. at 551. Indeed, the court’s consideration of that information and those
arguments was “necessary to [the] completion of [its] task,” id., because of the court’s obligation
to consider each of the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a), including the nature and
circumstances of the offenses, along with any relevant Sentencing Guidelines and the
defendants’ requests for downward variances. The court’s statements therefore derived from
intrajudicial sources...
the court has never taken the position the defense
ascribes to it: that former “President Trump should be prosecuted and imprisoned.” Motion at 1.
And the defense does not cite any instance of the court ever uttering those words or anything
similar. Instead, the defense interprets the court’s verbal reiteration of Palmer and Priola’s
arguments about their relative culpability as “suggest[ing]” a secret “core view” about
Defendant’s criminality. Id. at 7; see id. at 6 (the “statement that ‘t’s a blind loyalty to one
person who, by the way, remains free to this day’ . . . suggests that President Trump has
culpability for the events of that day and should not be free”); id. at 7 (the court’s reference to
Palmer’s argument “that the people who exhorted you and encouraged you and rallied you . . .
have not been charged” is “a suggestion that President Trump may and should be prosecuted...
prosecuted. Id. at 551. Indeed, the court’s consideration of that information and those
arguments was “necessary to [the] completion of [its] task,” id., because of the court’s obligation
to consider each of the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a), including the nature and
circumstances of the offenses, along with any relevant Sentencing Guidelines and the
defendants’ requests for downward variances. The court’s statements therefore derived from
intrajudicial sources...
the court has never taken the position the defense
ascribes to it: that former “President Trump should be prosecuted and imprisoned.” Motion at 1.
And the defense does not cite any instance of the court ever uttering those words or anything
similar. Instead, the defense interprets the court’s verbal reiteration of Palmer and Priola’s
arguments about their relative culpability as “suggest[ing]” a secret “core view” about
Defendant’s criminality. Id. at 7; see id. at 6 (the “statement that ‘t’s a blind loyalty to one
person who, by the way, remains free to this day’ . . . suggests that President Trump has
culpability for the events of that day and should not be free”); id. at 7 (the court’s reference to
Palmer’s argument “that the people who exhorted you and encouraged you and rallied you . . .
have not been charged” is “a suggestion that President Trump may and should be prosecuted...
p 12 of 20:
...based on those facts”). That inferential leap is not reasonable in light of the relevant facts,
record, and law...
... A reasonable person—aware of the statutory requirement that the court address
the defendant’s arguments and state its reasons for its sentence—would understand that in
making the statements contested here, the court was not issuing vague declarations about third
parties’ potential guilt in a hypothetical future case; instead, it was fulfilling its duty to expressly
evaluate the defendants’ arguments that their sentences should be reduced because other
individuals whom they believed were associated with the events of January 6 had not been
prosecuted...The defense here focuses on...
record, and law...
... A reasonable person—aware of the statutory requirement that the court address
the defendant’s arguments and state its reasons for its sentence—would understand that in
making the statements contested here, the court was not issuing vague declarations about third
parties’ potential guilt in a hypothetical future case; instead, it was fulfilling its duty to expressly
evaluate the defendants’ arguments that their sentences should be reduced because other
individuals whom they believed were associated with the events of January 6 had not been
prosecuted...The defense here focuses on...
p 13 of 20:
...court’s comments that Palmer made a “very good point” about other people not being charged or
not, and that “I have my opinions” about the “issue of who has or has not been charged.” Motion
at 2, 7. But the court expressly declined to state who, if anyone, it thought should still face
charges. It is the defense, not the court, who has assumed that the Defendant belongs in that
undefined group... e.g., Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 723 (holding that a ...
not, and that “I have my opinions” about the “issue of who has or has not been charged.” Motion
at 2, 7. But the court expressly declined to state who, if anyone, it thought should still face
charges. It is the defense, not the court, who has assumed that the Defendant belongs in that
undefined group... e.g., Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 723 (holding that a ...
p 14 of 20:
judge’s statement “that my personal beliefs cannot guide my responsibility and judgments”
negated inference that the judge would act partially in accordance with his stated personal
beliefs). The record “as a whole” does not support a reasonable question as to the court’s
impartiality. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 723.
Legal precedent also counsels against recusal in this case...
negated inference that the judge would act partially in accordance with his stated personal
beliefs). The record “as a whole” does not support a reasonable question as to the court’s
impartiality. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 723.
Legal precedent also counsels against recusal in this case...
Layman's summary of Judge Don't Play Chutkan:
1. You all don't have just cause;
2. You all want to judge shop;
3. You all don't know what I was talking about;
4. I can cite more support and precedent rulings than you;
5. You frivolous delay assholes don't know what you're talking about.
gave tRump the one finger salute.
malaise.
