Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
excerpt - full report w/ footnotes available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-6.pdf
H. Possible Military Dimensions
47. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these. Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Iran has dismissed the Agency’s concerns, largely on the grounds that Iran considers them to be based on unfounded allegations.
48. The Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. Since November 2011, the Agency has obtained more information which further corroborates the analysis contained in the aforementioned Annex.
49. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency. As indicated in Section B above, since the publication of the Director General’s November 2011 report, although the Board has adopted two resolutions addressing the urgent need to resolve outstanding issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions, it has not been possible to finalize the structured approach document or to begin substantive work in this regard.
50. Parchin: As stated in the Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report, information provided to the Agency by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments; such experiments would be strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development. The information also indicates that the containment vessel was installed at the Parchin site in 2000. The location at the Parchin site of the vessel was only identified in March 2011, and the Agency notified Iran of that location in January 2012.
51. As previously reported, satellite imagery available to the Agency for the period from February 2005 to January 2012 shows virtually no activity at or near the building housing the containment vessel (chamber building). Since the Agency’s first request for access to this location, however, satellite imagery shows that extensive activities and resultant changes have taken place at this location. The Agency has reiterated during each round of talks with Iran its request for access to the location at the Parchin site, but Iran has not acceded to that request.
52. Among the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location since the Director General’s report in November 2012 are:
o Reinstatement of some of the chamber building’s features (e.g. wall panels and exhaust piping);
o Alterations to the roofs of the chamber building and the other large building;
o Dismantlement and reconstruction of the annex to the other large building;
o Construction of one small building at the same place where a building of similar size had previously been demolished;
o Spreading, levelling and compacting of another layer of material over a large area; and
o Installation of a fence that divides the location into two areas.
53. As previously reported, Iran has stated that the allegation of nuclear activities at the Parchin site is “baseless” and that “the recent activities claimed to be conducted in the vicinity of the location of interest to the Agency, has nothing to do with specified location by the Agency”. To date, Iran has only provided an explanation for the soil displacement by trucks, which it stated was “due to constructing the Parchin new road”.
54. In light of the extensive activities that have been, and continue to be, undertaken by Iran at the aforementioned location on the Parchin site, when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability to conduct effective verification will have been seriously undermined. While the Agency continues to assess that it is necessary to have access to this location without further delay, it is essential that Iran also provide without further delay substantive answers to the Agency’s detailed questions regarding the Parchin site and the foreign expert, as requested by the Agency in February 2012.
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