What Does Opposition to War in Syria Tell Us About the State of International Law?
September 16, 2013
The roller coaster of international debate over Syria in the past three weeks seems to have come to a stop as the framework of an agreement has been reached to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons program and the United States has moved back from the brink of war. For those who celebrate the rule of international law, this may be a welcome turn, but it is too soon to breathe easy because, like any roller coaster, the ride might be gearing up for another go-around; it is still not clear that a unilateral military intervention is off the table. Beyond that, for much of the American public, anyway, the prospect of a U.S. strike is unappealing not necessarily because of its illegality, but rather because of its punitive and open-ended nature. Nonetheless, proponents of international law may find some hope in the prevailing American attitude toward war. The last ten years may not have convinced the United States of the validity of the international rules on the use of force, but they have made much of the world warier of using military force for political aims.
Is Military Intervention Still on the Table?
The weapons deal reached last week calls for Syria to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and demands the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons materials in the first half of 2014. The agreement is to be backed by a U.N. Security Council resolution that, according to reports, will threaten sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter if Syria fails to comply. Does this mean that a violation by Syria will result in military intervention? Not necessarily. Chapter VII covers the Security Council’s powers with respect to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”
Colloquially, “Chapter VII” is used to denote that the Security Council means business, and many contrast this with Chapter VI, which covers “pacific settlement of disputes.” But it is important to note that the coercive measures contemplated under Chapter VII include not only the use of armed force, but also economic sanctions and severance of diplomatic relations—coercive measures, yes, but far from martial in nature. Thus, in its 2011 resolution imposing an arms embargo against Libya and ordering an assets freeze and travel ban against Libyan officials, along with a referral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, the Security Council was likewise acting under Chapter VII—but military intervention was not addressed until a separate resolution weeks later.
With these other Chapter VII options on the table, U.N. authorization of military intervention in Syria appears even less likely. And Russia’s clear stance against the use of force, combined with their permanent member status and veto, might all but seal the case against Security Council action to intervene militarily. Accordingly, there is a distinct possibility that Syria will end up in violation of the recent agreement, but at the center of a new stalemate regarding the consequences. While some have likened the current situation to that in Iraq ten years ago, it is at this point that the similarities would become much more concrete.
- See more at: http://verdict.justia.com/2013/09/16/what-does-opposition-to-war-in-syria-tell-us-about-the-state-of-international-law#sthash.zblHnMhG.dpuf
= new reply since forum marked as read
