How to rig an automated election in the Philippines

[deminks]

http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=how-to-rig-an-automated-election-in-the-philippines&id=97771

(snip)

The first way involves adding and changing a few lines of programming code (instructions) in the software of the voting and counting machine. In essence, the changed instructions can direct the computer to add one vote to a particular candidate and subtract one vote from another candidate. This is the electronic form of dagdag-bawas (literally, add-subtract). It’s a simple algorithm and any programmer who’s studied the program can easily do it.

(snip)

The second way involves transmitting fake precinct returns to the central canvassing and tallying computers. This was made possible -- again, in both the 2010 and 2013 polls -- because Comelec explicitly refused to implement another requirement of our automated election law, that of requiring precinct returns to be digitally signed by the by-law-designated election official. What a “digital signature” entails is the encryption of the transmitted returns using a “private key” (a very long string of digits) unique to a designated election official. This basically identifies the sender, authenticates the document being transmitted, and ensures that it hasn’t been altered.

(snip)

A third way of changing election outcomes is through the compact flash (CF) cards, the memory devices that contain the configuration settings that determine how the PCOS machine will appreciate a particular ballot. The prescribed specification for these CF cards is that these should be non-rewritable, that is to say, “write-once.” Once the configuration has been written into a write-once CF card, it can no longer be overwritten and modified. The reason for this requirement is to prevent the CF cards that are installed into the voting machines deployed to the individual precincts from being altered to “mis-appreciate” the ballots of voters. Changing CF card configurations can mean that certain shaded boxes will simply not be read as votes for a candidate.

(snip)

It is easy to rig the results of an automated election without proper security safeguards and independent validation mechanisms. In essence, the trouble with Comelec’s implementation of our computerized polls is that, in brazen violation of our election laws, it disabled standard computer security protocols that could ensure the integrity of the system and protect the data being tallied from being altered and modified. Furthermore, also in violation of our election laws, Comelec eliminated all the mechanisms that would allow the public and independent observers to authenticate the data being electronically transmitted and to verify the count. In short, the system is completely untransparent and there is no way for us, the public, to validate the results. Whatever Comelec proclaims as the outcome of any race has to be accepted by the rest of us on sheer faith.

(end snip)

Fascinating article about vote rigging,...in the Philippines.