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Purveyor

(29,876 posts)
Tue Sep 2, 2014, 11:57 AM Sep 2014

Angelo Mozilo Speaks: No Regrets at Countrywide

By Max Abelson Sep 2, 2014 12:00 AM ET

Angelo Mozilo cannot believe it.

Six years after he lost control of the largest mortgage lender in the U.S., and days after news that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles plans to sue him, the Countrywide Financial Corp. founder is baffled by a new effort to punish him, proud of past triumphs and incensed by criticism.

“You’ll have to ask those people, ‘What do you have against Mozilo, what did he do?’” he said in a 30-minute call with Bloomberg News before Labor Day, one of his few interviews since the firm’s downfall. “Countrywide didn’t change. I didn’t change. The world changed.”

Interviews with Mozilo, 75, and three friends show what retirement looks like for a chief executive officer linked to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Remaining out of public view like Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s Richard Fuld or Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns Cos., Mozilo has submitted plans for Old West-style offices in California, taught students in Italy about finance, invested in a building in the Arizona desert that houses a Taco Bell and written about his life so that his grandchildren will “know the truth.”

He remains a defender of Countrywide, even after Bank of America Corp., which bought it in 2008, agreed last month to pay more than $16 billion to end probes into mortgage-bond sales on top of about $55 billion in fines that came before. Mozilo doesn’t understand why he and his firm, blamed by lawmakers and authorities for lax underwriting and predatory lending, have been seen as villains.

“No, no, no, we didn’t do anything wrong,” he said, adding that a real estate collapse was the root of the crisis. “Countrywide or Mozilo didn’t cause any of that.”

more...

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-02/angelo-mozilo-speaks-no-villainy-at-countrywide.html

6 replies = new reply since forum marked as read
Highlight: NoneDon't highlight anything 5 newestHighlight 5 most recent replies
Angelo Mozilo Speaks: No Regrets at Countrywide (Original Post) Purveyor Sep 2014 OP
Of Course He Has No Regrets, Sir: He Is Not In Jail The Magistrate Sep 2014 #1
Being in the 1% means never having to say you are sorry. nt bemildred Sep 2014 #2
I don't know if he's a Made Man PeoViejo Sep 2014 #3
Money talks and Bullsh*t walks. Wellstone ruled Sep 2014 #4
I'd like a few minutes with Mr. Mozilo to "tell" him what he did calikid Sep 2014 #5
reminder: what the SEC had on him geek tragedy Sep 2014 #6
 

Wellstone ruled

(34,661 posts)
4. Money talks and Bullsh*t walks.
Tue Sep 2, 2014, 12:33 PM
Sep 2014

Familiar with Countrywide Sales. Talk about a guy who won't except the fact that,he and his thugs for partners,knew what was going down on a minute to minute basis. This was a typical Mob operation and these asshole should be RICO'ed right to the jail house. Notice how Bloomberg did a touchy feely fluff piece on these Con Men.

calikid

(584 posts)
5. I'd like a few minutes with Mr. Mozilo to "tell" him what he did
Tue Sep 2, 2014, 10:19 PM
Sep 2014

to me. The hell I lived through for years with Countrywide, and then with Bank of America, fortunately, I was one
of the few that came out okay in the end, but still, there was about six years of utter hell.

 

geek tragedy

(68,868 posts)
6. reminder: what the SEC had on him
Tue Sep 2, 2014, 11:02 PM
Sep 2014
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-129-email.htm

Excerpts of E-Mails From Angelo Mozilo
Sept. 26, 2006 — following up a meeting with Sambol the previous day about the Pay-Option ARM loan portfolio:

We have no way, with any reasonable certainty, to assess the real risk of holding these loans on our balance sheet. The only history we can look to is that of World Savings however their portfolio was fundamentally different than ours in that their focus was equity and our focus is fico. In my judgement [sic], as a long time lender, I would always trade off fico for equity. The bottom line is that we are flying blind on how these loans will perform in a stressed environment of higher unemployment, reduced values and slowing home sales.



… pay options are currently mispriced in the secondary market, and that spread could disappear quickly if there is an foreseen [sic] headline event such as another lender getting into deep trouble with this product or because of negative investor occurance [sic].



"timing is right" … to … "sell all newly originated pay options and begin rolling off the bank balance sheet, in an orderly manner, pay options currently in their port[folio]."


April 17, 2006 — to Sambol concerning Countrywide's subprime 80/20 loans:

In all my years in the business I have never seen a more toxic prduct [sic]. It's not only subordinated to the first, but the first is subprime. In addition, the FICOs are below 600, below 500 and some below 400[.] With real estate values coming down…the product will become increasingly worse. There has [sic] to be major changes in this program, including substantial increases in the minimum FICO. … Whether you consider the business milk or not, I am prepared to go without milk irrespective of the consequences to our production.

April 13, 2006 — to Sambol, Sieracki, and others to address issues relating to the 100 percent subprime second business in light of the losses associated with the HSBC buyback:

Loans had been originated … "through our channels with disregard for process [and] compliance with guidelines."



He "personally observed a serious lack of compliance within our origination system as it relates to documentation and generally a deterioration in the quality of loans originated versus the pricing of those loan [sic]."



"n my conversations with Sambol he calls the 100% sub prime seconds as the 'milk' of the business. Frankly, I consider that product line to be the poison of ours."

On March 28, 2006 — to Sambol and others:

Directed them to implement a series of corrective measures to "avoid the errors of both judgment and protocol that have led to the issues that we face today caused by the buybacks mandated by HSBC." …

… The 100% loan-to-value subprime product is "the most dangerous product in existence and there can be nothing more toxic and therefore requires that no deviation from guidelines be permitted irrespective of the circumstances."

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