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‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works, and How It Doesn’t
http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/16/hybrid-war-and-little-green-men-how-it-works-and-how-it-doesnt/Hybrid War and Little Green Men: How It Works, and How It Doesnt
Mark Galeotti, Apr 16 2015
Excerpt:
Crimea: When It Works
The application of these new, deniable, and politically driven tactics in Ukraine has proven their potential value, but also the risks. In so many ways, Crimea was the perfect context in which the Russians could test out their new approach. The Peninsula already had Russian Black Sea Fleet facilities including the 810th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade, amongst whom KSO operators could quietly be secreted under cover of regular troop rotations. The local Ukrainian military forces, which in any event would never get clear orders from Kiev, were essentially technicians and mechanics, not front-line combat troops. The local population, alienated by twenty years of neglect and maladministration by Kiev, were largely willing to join richer Russia, and there were political and also criminal powerbrokers especially eager to become the agents of a new Muscovite order.
On 27 February, KSO and Naval Infantry seized the Crimean parliament building and began blockading Ukrainian bases on Crimea. Despite their modern Russian uniforms and weapons, the lack of insignia on these little green men and Moscows flat denial that they were Russian troops was enough to inject a moments uncertainty into the calculations in both Kiev and NATO. Were they mercenaries, could it be Crimean vigilantes, or was this some unsanctioned adventure by a local commander? This deliberate maskirovka, or deception operations, was enough to give the Russians and their local allies the time to take up commanding positions across Crimea, including blockading Ukrainian garrisons, such that even if they had then been ordered to fight, they would have been in a very weak position. Ultimately, they surrendered after at most the demonstrative use of a few tear gas grenades, and Russia was able to seize Crimea without a single fatal casualty (Howard and Pukhov, 2014).
The reasons for the success were several. The new government in Kiev was already in disarray and mistrustful of its military commanders, something Moscow could encourage. The Russians had not only good troops already in-theatre and the opportunity covertly to introduce more, they also had a broadly supportive local population. Ukrainian forces, by contrast, were largely not combat ready, scattered in smaller garrisons, demoralised and in some cases sympathetic to or suborned by the Russians. Likewise, the local police and even Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) were penetrated by the Russians, while there were ample allies within the Crimean political and criminal elite to provide both compliant front men and a supply of thuggish local self-defence militias.
For Moscow, these were the ideal possible conditions. They precluded the need to destabilise the target before intervention, allowed Russia to wage a pre-emptive information war to establish grounds for its mission, and allowed it to use its troops to assert and maintain a near-bloodless fait accompli with, if not deniability, at least a degree of ambiguity.
The Donbas: When it Doesnt
However, the subsequent adventure into south-eastern Ukraine Novorossiya in the new Russian lexicon while undoubtedly also following the non-linear war playbook, has shown how this is by no means the guaranteed war-winner some had initially assumed. Again, the Russians armed and supported irregular allied detachments, backed by a deniable force of their own special forces, while presenting this as an entirely spontaneous and local response to an illegal transfer of power in Kiev. The full panoply of Russian propaganda was deployed to muddy the waters in the West, especially by presenting the new Ukrainian regime as comprising or depending on fascists.
The expectation appears to have been again that this would be a quick operation that would capitalise on Western hesitancy and its need for consensus politics. Chaos would be stirred up in Novorossiya to demonstrate to Kiev just what could happen if it failed to appreciate its place within Moscows sphere of influence. Rather than face a Russian-backed insurgency just at the time it was trying to build a new Ukraine, the government would make suitable obeisance and concessions, above all ruling out further movement towards the European Union and NATO and also constitutional guarantees for Moscows allies and clients in the east. Russian active operations would be ended, and all before the West had had a chance to decide what to do.
So much for neat plans, and the Kremlins glib assumptions that all would run smoothly epitomises a cocky attitude that prevailed in government circles after Crimea. As one senior military advisor told me at that time, Russia is back. And we now know of what we are capable. The very disarray in Kiev, which had worked to Moscows advantage over Crimea, now proved a serious problem, as there was no one there able or willing to make the kind of politically ruinous concessions the Russians were demanding. Instead, a short, victorious little war (as Interior Minister Plehve invoked before the disastrous 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War) turned into a bleeding wound (as Mikhail Gorbachev characterised the 1979-88 invasion of Afghanistan).
Militarily, Russia could maintain the war, not least by the drip-fed addition of military matériel for the fighters of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples Republics. Russian troops maintain a role on the battlefield in the guise of volunteers alongside locals, mercenaries, and adventurers, including many Russians and Cossacks marshalled and armed by the GRU in Rostov and moved across the border into Ukraine (RFE/RL, 2014). Others provide training or technical support for the heavy weapons Russia has provided. In situations where it looks as if government troops might even make serious headway on the battlefield, such as in August, a large body of Russian troops were deployed across the border directly to ensure that the insurgent forces were not defeated, only then to be withdrawn all without any formal acknowledgement of their role.
Russia has been able to maintain an insurgency which, by all accounts, has some genuine local support, but which in military terms is really best considered a loose coalition of local warlords, gangsters, opportunists, and Kremlin proxies. However, it has done so at catastrophic cost, considering the economic impact of the consequent Western sanctions regime, and with no evidence of any successful outcome. Both Kiev and Moscow now want the conflict to end, but unless one side or the other is willing to make greater concessions than have yet been placed on the table, Novorossiya risks becoming an unviable frozen conflict, a pseudo-state dependent on Moscow for its security and economic survival, while in return dooming Russia to continuing international opprobrium and economic crisis
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‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works, and How It Doesn’t (Original Post)
Tommy_Carcetti
Apr 2015
OP
Russia used these to provide security to Crimea during a constitutional Crisis. We use "little grey
newthinking
Apr 2015
#2
This acts as if the US is not conducting "Hybrid war" with little grey men" all over the globe.
newthinking
Apr 2015
#3
Fumesucker
(45,851 posts)1. I'd appreciate it if you left me out of this particular fracas
Thanks..
newthinking
(3,982 posts)2. Russia used these to provide security to Crimea during a constitutional Crisis. We use "little grey
men" all over the world, across any border we choose, in operations throughout the world now. It is entirely disingenuous for the US to make a stink about this, especially given the circumstances and the desire of the people there.
Better we all work toward getting back to a sane world without having weapons and fighters and tit for tat overthrows and military operations.
newthinking
(3,982 posts)3. This acts as if the US is not conducting "Hybrid war" with little grey men" all over the globe.
Dirty Wars
http://dirtywars.org/