Deutsche Bank Agrees to Pay $7.2 Billion for Misleading Investors

[nitpicker]

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-bank-agrees-pay-72-billion-misleading-investors-its-sale-residential-mortgage-backed

Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, January 17, 2017

Deutsche Bank Agrees to Pay $7.2 Billion for Misleading Investors in its Sale of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities

Deutsche Bank’s Conduct Contributed to the 2008 Financial Crisis

The Justice Department, along with federal partners, announced today a $7.2 billion settlement with Deutsche Bank resolving federal civil claims that Deutsche Bank misled investors in the packaging, securitization, marketing, sale and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) between 2006 and 2007. This $7.2 billion agreement represents the single largest RMBS resolution for the conduct of a single entity. The settlement requires Deutsche Bank to pay a $3.1 billion civil penalty under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). Under the settlement, Deutsche Bank will also provide $4.1 billion in relief to underwater homeowners, distressed borrowers and affected communities.
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As part of the settlement, Deutsche Bank agreed to a detailed Statement of Facts. That statement describes how Deutsche Bank knowingly made false and misleading representations to investors about the characteristics of the mortgage loans it securitized in RMBS worth billions of dollars issued by the bank between 2006 and 2007. For example:
•Deutsche Bank represented to investors that loans securitized in its RMBS were originated generally in accordance with mortgage loan originators’ underwriting guidelines. But as Deutsche Bank now acknowledges, the bank’s own reviews confirmed that “aggressive” revisions to the loan originators’ underwriting guidelines allowed for loans to be underwritten to anyone with “half a pulse.” More generally, Deutsche Bank knew, based on the results of due diligence, that for some securitized loan pools, more than 50 percent of the loans subjected to due diligence did not meet loan originators’ guidelines.

•Deutsche Bank also knowingly misrepresented that loans had been reviewed to ensure the ability of borrowers to repay their loans. As Deutsche Bank acknowledges, the bank’s own employees recognized that Deutsche Bank would “tolerate misrepresentation” with “misdirected lending practices” as to borrower ability to pay, accepting even blocked-out borrower pay stubs that concealed borrowers’ actual incomes. As a Deutsche Bank employee stated, “What goes around will eventually come around; when performance (default) begins affecting profits and/or the investors who purchase the securities, only then will Wall St. take notice. For now, the buying continues.”

•Deutsche Bank concealed from investors that significant numbers of borrowers had second liens on their properties. In one instance, a supervisory Deutsche Bank trader specifically instructed his team that if investors asked about second liens, “‘[t]ell them verbally . . . ut don’t put in the prospectus.’” Deutsche Bank knew that these second liens increased the likelihood that a borrower would default on his or her loan.

•Deutsche Bank purchased and securitized loans with substantial defects to provide “flexibility” to the mortgage originators on whom Deutsche Bank’s RMBS program depended for a continued supply of loans. Indeed, after the president of a large mortgage originator told Deutsche Bank he was “very upset with the rejection percentage,” Deutsche Bank’s diligence team was instructed, on three separate occasions, to clear loans it previously determined should be rejected.

•While Deutsche Bank conducted due diligence on samples of loans it securitized in RMBS, Deutsche Bank knew that the size and composition of these loan samples frequently failed to capture loans that did not meet its representations to investors. In fact, Deutsche Bank knew “the more you sample, the more you reject.”

•Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally securitized loans originated based on unsupported and fraudulent appraisals. Deutsche Bank knew that mortgage originators were “‘giving’ appraisers the value they want[ed]” and expecting the resulting appraisals to meet the originators’ desired value, regardless of the actual value of the property. Deutsche Bank concealed its knowledge of pervasive and consistent appraisal fraud, instead representing to investors home valuation metrics based on appraisals it knew to be fraudulent. Deutsche Bank misrepresented to investors the value of the properties securing the loans securitized in its RMBS and concealed from investors that it knew that the value of the properties securing the loans was far below the value reflected by the originator’s appraisal.

•By May 2007, Deutsche Bank knew that there was an increasing trend of overvalued properties being sold to Deutsche Bank for securitization. As one employee noted, “We are finding ourselves going back quite often and clearing large numbers of loans [with inflated appraisals] to bring down the deletion percentages.” Deutsche Bank nonetheless purchased and securitized such loans because it received favorable prices on the fraudulent loans. Ultimately, Deutsche Bank enriched itself by paying reduced prices for risky loans while representing to investors valuation metrics based on appraisals the Bank knew to be inflated.

•Deutsche Bank represented to investors that disclosed borrower FICO scores were accurate as of the “cut-off date” of the RMBS issuance. However, Deutsche Bank knowingly represented borrowers’ FICO scores as of the time of the origination of their loans despite the bank’s knowledge that these scores had often declined materially by the cut-off date.
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