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Environment & Energy
Related: About this forumA VALUABLE REPUTATION After Tyrone Hayes said that a chemical was harmful, its maker pursued him
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/02/10/140210fa_fact_avivHayes has devoted the past fifteen years to studying atrazine, a widely used herbicide made by Syngenta. The companys notes reveal that it struggled to make sense of him, and plotted ways to discredit him. Photograph by Dan Winters.
IIn 2001, seven years after joining the biology faculty of the University of California, Berkeley, Tyrone Hayes stopped talking about his research with people he didnt trust. He instructed the students in his lab, where he was raising three thousand frogs, to hang up the phone if they heard a click, a signal that a third party might be on the line. Other scientists seemed to remember events differently, he noticed, so he started carrying an audio recorder to meetings. The secret to a happy, successful life of paranoia, he liked to say, is to keep careful track of your persecutors.
Three years earlier, Syngenta, one of the largest agribusinesses in the world, had asked Hayes to conduct experiments on the herbicide atrazine, which is applied to more than half the corn in the United States. Hayes was thirty-one, and he had already published twenty papers on the endocrinology of amphibians. David Wake, a professor in Hayess department, said that Hayes may have had the greatest potential of anyone in the field. But, when Hayes discovered that atrazine might impede the sexual development of frogs, his dealings with Syngenta became strained, and, in November, 2000, he ended his relationship with the company.
Hayes continued studying atrazine on his own, and soon he became convinced that Syngenta representatives were following him to conferences around the world. He worried that the company was orchestrating a campaign to destroy his reputation. He complained that whenever he gave public talks there was a stranger in the back of the room, taking notes. On a trip to Washington, D.C., in 2003, he stayed at a different hotel each night. He was still in touch with a few Syngenta scientists and, after noticing that they knew many details about his work and his schedule, he suspected that they were reading his e-mails. To confuse them, he asked a student to write misleading e-mails from his office computer while he was travelling. He sent backup copies of his data and notes to his parents in sealed boxes. In an e-mail to one Syngenta scientist, he wrote that he had risked my reputation, my name . . . some say even my life, for what I thought (and now know) is right. A few scientists had previously done experiments that anticipated Hayess work, but no one had observed such extreme effects. In another e-mail to Syngenta, he acknowledged that it might appear that he was suffering from a Napoleon complex or delusions of grandeur.
For years, despite his achievements, Hayes had felt like an interloper. In academic settings, it seemed to him that his colleagues were operating according to a frivolous code of manners: they spoke so formally, fashioning themselves as detached authorities, and rarely admitted what they didnt know. He had grown up in Columbia, South Carolina, in a neighborhood where fewer than forty per cent of residents finish high school. Until sixth grade, when he was accepted into a program for the gifted, in a different neighborhood, he had never had a conversation with a white person his age. He and his friends used to tell one another how white people do this, and white people do that, pretending that they knew. After he switched schools and took advanced courses, the black kids made fun of him, saying, Oh, he thinks hes white.
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A VALUABLE REPUTATION After Tyrone Hayes said that a chemical was harmful, its maker pursued him (Original Post)
xchrom
Feb 2014
OP
Demeter
(85,373 posts)1. Snowdens are Made, not Born
Made, by the evil they see around them, to fight that evil.
azul
(1,638 posts)3. The toxic chemicals will frame him
for some ghastly crime, just like the doctor in the fugitive, if they can get away with it.
Toxic chemicals can sometimes assume a business life and can be considered armed and dangerous to threats to their existence.
It is astonishing that we have allowed a legal system to place business interests ahead of life itself. It is corruption at its worst.
kristopher
(29,798 posts)4. A Damning Indictment of Industry and Regulatory Capture
...According to company e-mails, Syngenta was distressed by Hayess work. Its public-relations team compiled a database of more than a hundred supportive third party stakeholders, including twenty-five professors, who could defend atrazine or act as spokespeople on Hayes. The P.R. team suggested that the company purchase Tyrone Hayes as a search word on the internet, so that any time someone searches for Tyrones material, the first thing they see is our material. The proposal was later expanded to include the phrases amphibian hayes, atrazine frogs, and frog feminization. (Searching online for Tyrone Hayes now brings up an advertisement that says, Tyrone Hayes Not Credible.)
...an organization called the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness petitioned the E.P.A. to ignore Hayess findings. Hayes has killed and continues to kill thousands of frogs in unvalidated tests that have no proven value, the petition said. The center argued that Hayess studies violated the Data Quality Act, passed in 2000, which requires that regulatory decisions rely on studies that meet high standards for quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity. The center is run by an industry lobbyist and consultant for Syngenta, Jim Tozzi, who proposed the language of the Data Quality Act to the congresswoman who sponsored it.
The E.P.A. complied with the Data Quality Act and revised its Environmental Risk Assessment, making it clear that hormone disruption wouldnt be a legitimate reason for restricting use of the chemical until appropriate testing protocols have been established.
...The E.P.A. approved the continued use of atrazine in October, the same month that the European Commission chose to remove it from the market. The European Union generally takes a precautionary approach to environmental risks, choosing restraint in the face of uncertainty. In the U.S., lingering scientific questions justify delays in regulatory decisions. Since the mid-seventies, the E.P.A. has issued regulations restricting the use of only five industrial chemicals out of more than eighty thousand in the environment. Industries have a greater role in the American regulatory processthey may sue regulators if there are errors in the scientific recordand cost-benefit analyses are integral to decisions: a monetary value is assigned to disease, impairments, and shortened lives and weighed against the benefits of keeping a chemical in use. Lisa Heinzerling, the senior climate-policy counsel at the E.P.A. in 2009 and the associate administrator of the office of policy in 2009 and 2010, said that cost-benefit models appear objective and neutral, a way to free ourselves from the chaos of politics. But the complex algorithms quietly condone a tremendous amount of risk. She added that the influence of the Office of Management and Budget, which oversees major regulatory decisions, has deepened in recent years. A rule will go through years of scientific reviews and cost-benefit analyses, and then at the final stage it doesnt pass, she said. It has a terrible, demoralizing effect on the culture at the E.P.A.
...an organization called the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness petitioned the E.P.A. to ignore Hayess findings. Hayes has killed and continues to kill thousands of frogs in unvalidated tests that have no proven value, the petition said. The center argued that Hayess studies violated the Data Quality Act, passed in 2000, which requires that regulatory decisions rely on studies that meet high standards for quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity. The center is run by an industry lobbyist and consultant for Syngenta, Jim Tozzi, who proposed the language of the Data Quality Act to the congresswoman who sponsored it.
The E.P.A. complied with the Data Quality Act and revised its Environmental Risk Assessment, making it clear that hormone disruption wouldnt be a legitimate reason for restricting use of the chemical until appropriate testing protocols have been established.
...The E.P.A. approved the continued use of atrazine in October, the same month that the European Commission chose to remove it from the market. The European Union generally takes a precautionary approach to environmental risks, choosing restraint in the face of uncertainty. In the U.S., lingering scientific questions justify delays in regulatory decisions. Since the mid-seventies, the E.P.A. has issued regulations restricting the use of only five industrial chemicals out of more than eighty thousand in the environment. Industries have a greater role in the American regulatory processthey may sue regulators if there are errors in the scientific recordand cost-benefit analyses are integral to decisions: a monetary value is assigned to disease, impairments, and shortened lives and weighed against the benefits of keeping a chemical in use. Lisa Heinzerling, the senior climate-policy counsel at the E.P.A. in 2009 and the associate administrator of the office of policy in 2009 and 2010, said that cost-benefit models appear objective and neutral, a way to free ourselves from the chaos of politics. But the complex algorithms quietly condone a tremendous amount of risk. She added that the influence of the Office of Management and Budget, which oversees major regulatory decisions, has deepened in recent years. A rule will go through years of scientific reviews and cost-benefit analyses, and then at the final stage it doesnt pass, she said. It has a terrible, demoralizing effect on the culture at the E.P.A.
MisterP
(23,730 posts)5. know your whitewashers
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Tony_Gilland
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Royal_Society#Pro-GM_-_Attacking_Pusztai
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Jon_Entine
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/American_Council_on_Science_and_Health
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Rising_Rhetoric_on_Genetically_Modified_Crops
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Royal_Society#Pro-GM_-_Attacking_Pusztai
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Jon_Entine
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/American_Council_on_Science_and_Health
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Rising_Rhetoric_on_Genetically_Modified_Crops