Brutal Truths: Retreat in Ramadi should trigger a review of coalition's ISIL strategy

[KoKo]

Brutal truths about ISIL victories
Retreat in Ramadi should trigger a review of coalition's ISIL strategy.

20 May 2015 12:19 GMT | War & Conflict, Politics, Middle East, Iraq, ISIL
Afzal Ashraf

Afzal Ashraf is a consultant fellow at Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) and served in the UK Armed Forces. He was involved in developing a counterinsurgency strategy and in the policing and the justice sectors in Iraq.

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/05/iraq-truths-isil-victories-ramadi-150519050240243.html

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As with many things in the Iraq conflict different people can interpret the fall of Ramadi in different ways. The US chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's claim that Ramadi was "not symbolic in any way" could be construed as reasonable. Certainly Ramadi has always been a city where the insurgency's influence has ebbed and flowed, ever since the US-led invasion in 2003.

But it is also reasonable to question the effectiveness of the coalition against ISIL, particularly the willingness of Iraq's army to fight for its nation's security. The overall strategy of fighting ISIL using Western-led air power and Iraqi-only land forces is another issue worthy of critical review.

Over a year on from the blitzkrieg advance of ISIL in Iraq it seems that whatever reorganisation, training and re-equipment that the army was given, it has failed to redress its previous humiliating defeat.
Who is accountable for the fall of Ramadi?

The primary cause of its defeat a year ago was the failure of the generals to stand and fight. Despite the Iraqi prime minister's pleas to stand and fight now, it seems that soldiers are continuing to desert their positions.

Face-saving Myths

A great many face-saving myths have been created about ISIL having superior weapons and training. These are largely baseless. ISIL lacks the armour, mobility, intelligence support and air power that the Iraqi army has at its disposal.

The superiority of ISIL is in its leadership and the motivation of its foot soldiers. That is a hard pill to swallow for not just the Iraqi government but also for the US. It was the US-led war for regime change in Iraq and its considerable investment in blood and treasure to establish a new form of government that is now proving to be an embarrassing failure.

These failures translate into successes for ISIL, which in turn feeds off one victory to produce another. ISIL's success threatens not just the Iraqis and Syrians but also the rest of the world. It has caused one of the largest displacement of people in history, it has motivated one of the widest recruitment of foreign fighters ever recorded and its stated ambition to overthrow a large swath of the Middle East, Africa, Asia and even parts of Europe is unprecedented for a non-state actor.

More at........
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/05/iraq-truths-isil-victories-ramadi-150519050240243.html

[Jesus Malverde]

1. They paraded through town a convoy of thousands and not a single coalition flight in sight.

strange world.

https://twitter.com/IraqiSecurity/status/600368151801569281/photo/1

[KoKo]

2. Much of it is very strange.

Where are we...As someone said on a News Report from Foreign Media today...U.S. Foreign Policy is "Drones and Ninjas." I had to think a bit and realized that there is some truth in that. But, then, I'm not in favor of U.S. Boots on the Ground once again since that didn't seem to work either.

I see Obama's Foreign Policy as a bit of "Hands Off" as he prepares to leave ....but, that might not work out for him given the dire situation and the Death, Destruction, Dislocation of Millions of Men, Women, Children whose whole lives have been affected and they are innocent of all of this. Caught up in circumstance they had little or no control over.

But, either we go in and bomb the hell out of everyone, put in major armed forces (where there will be hand to hand combat with ISIS and many deaths will occur)....or we leave it off to a new President. Or, we allow Iran and Russia to come in and take over where we left off to finish the rearranging of the MENA. Those solutions leave off U.S.'s responsibility for what has happened because of our meddling in such an aggressive way after "9/11" when we rushed without thinking to achieve a goal of a Think Tank who wrote the rules for "Remaking the ME to a their own self interested Model."

Not good options, imho.

[bemildred]

3. The Glaring (Ir)Relevance of Ramadi

What does the fall of Ramadi mean? Even as the Obama administration acknowledged that Ramadi was a setback, spokesman Josh Earnest shrugged it off, declaring that the administration won’t “light our hair on fire” every time there is a setback in Iraq. Meanwhile, hawkish critics of U.S. policy have jumped on the defeat to justify their call for a more robust response. The Pentagon first said Ramadi would be a significant loss, but then argued that it wasn’t. Senator John McCain, on the other hand, labeled the defeat an “abysmal failure.”

Rhetorical positioning aside, the fall of Ramadi is essentially irrelevant to the final outcome in Iraq. Though a city of moderate strategic value considering its proximity to Fallujah and Baghdad, Ramadi does not spell victory for ISIS anymore than Iraq’s retaking of Tikrit from the insurgents spelled defeat for ISIS (despite suggestions to the contrary from the Obama administration). The battle for Iraq will depend on the ability of the Iraqi government to mobilize enough effective fighting power to stop the ISIS expansion. Unfortunately for Iraq, despite over a decade of U.S. investment in training and equipment, Iraq’s military appears incapable of mustering consistent fighting effectiveness to deal a decisive blow to ISIS on the battlefield. The only sure way Iraq can hope to defeat ISIS is by encouraging greater external intervention in the form of airstrikes, weapons, and most importantly of all—ground troops.

Second, Ramadi is irrelevant because, absent a dramatic change after the 2016 elections, it will not change U.S. policy. The fall of Ramadi makes clear that limited U.S. airstrikes are not enough to do the job, but even more clear that Obama has no intention of sending enough military force to change, however briefly, the momentum on the ground. As Susan Rice told USA Today, "We are not going to own this battle as Americans and put combat forces back on the ground again," she said. "That is not what we are about." Iraq will get more weapons, more equipment, and a higher tempo training program, but these will not be enough.

If the U.S. military had managed to transform the Iraqi military into an effective fighting force during eight years of herculean efforts, Ramadi would not have happened. They could not, however, and there is no reason to think additional lesser efforts will work now. Even an expanded air campaign (for which there is little desire within the Obama administration) would be unlikely to make a difference. Given the risks of civilian casualties and the limits of airpower against irregular forces, airstrikes alone cannot roust ISIS from Ramadi or Fallujah. Without meaningful political reconciliation that invites the Sunnis to the table or an overwhelming ground force to compel them, Iraq’s civil war will continue in search of a victor.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-glaring-irrelevance-ramadi-12948

[KoKo]

5. Interesting article from "National Interest" Mimics what Richard Haas of CFR Said

yesterday on Bloomberg Surveillance News where he frequently appears as the Grand GURU for business interests. He was pushing everything off onto the new Iraqi Government being incompetent and alluding that THEY were at fault. This article from "National Interest written by it's Cato and George Mason affiliated writer has a startling comparison to what Richard Hass of CFR was putting out there yesterday for the Bloomberg Financial viewers.

It's amazing how they get their message out. It seems like CATO and CFR got together and decided to put out the same "Speak." But, I pick up a hint of desperation in this. Blame it on the New Iraqi Govt? If that's all we've got left of our Foreign Policy Strategy then we are in for some more hard lessons.

BTW: Hass said: "It's like Humpty Dumpty" and we aren't going to put it back together." He actually said that, but interestingly I've read that same statement, analogy...somewhere else in the past few months...but, can't recall the source at the moment. The MEME....

THEY ALL "SPEAKS ALIKE" THESE DAYS, it seems..these mighty Think Tanks.

[bemildred]

7. He takes a conveniently narrow view of the situation.

I think it sort of represents the naive inside-the-beltway view of the situation, very much aimed at blame deflection.

[bemildred]

4. Calm Down. ISIS Isn’t Winning.

WASHINGTON — THE fall of the Iraqi city of Ramadi on Sunday, and of the Syrian city of Palmyra on Wednesday, is a big gain for the Islamic State, but not an utter disaster, as many observers fear.

Rather than inducing panic in Western capitals, it should lead to a realistic assessment of the Islamic State’s strengths and weaknesses. One setback in a long war must not trigger hasty strategic shifts that lead to foreign countries’ becoming mired in Iraq once more.

Palmyra has economic and cultural significance, as it sits among gas fields and is home to renowned ruins. But Ramadi, in western Iraq, is of far greater military and strategic consequence.

The attack on Ramadi was a sign of desperation, not strength. It took 16 months of continual clashes with tenacious Iraqi security forces and loyal Sunni tribes before the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, could take Ramadi. Before it fell, the Islamic State already controlled half of the city. Its battlefield rivals were exhausted, and it wanted to give its adherents a psychological boost. Ramadi was a ripe target.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/opinion/calm-down-isis-isnt-winning.html

[KoKo]

6. MORE Group Speak....

Sheesh!

[bemildred]

8. Well it's better than McCain trying to get us more involved, see?

But they do risk being further embarassed.

[bemildred]

9. The collapse of Obama's ISIS strategy

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These setbacks underscore a few important points. First of all, there is no denying that the administration's strategy, or lack thereof, is failing in the Middle East. The Iraqi government forces are callous, lack fighting morale and are plagued by lack of discipline, corruption and squabbles between different divisions; they are completely incompetent overall. On top of that, there is sectarian rivalry among the country's armed forces, with forces in primarily Sunni areas divided in their loyalties between taking orders from an American-backed and mainly Shiite-dominated government and accepting help from neighboring Iran, a Shiite power and the largest supporter of Shiite militias fighting ISIS across Iraq. The Obama administration is struggling to overcome this huge trust deficit and lack of credibility not only in Iraq, but across the Middle East. No amount of training, materials and money can overcome a lack of morale if fighting forces are not ready to fight.

Secondly, the administration's half-hearted approach, lack of goals and conflicting interests in this war have created major problems. A few years ago at the beginning of the Arab Spring, Professor Daniel Drezner wrote an article in Foreign Policy magazine mentioning that maybe the Obama administration's intention was to keep war in the Middle East going at a slow burn, as instigating a war of attrition between the various destructive Arab and Iranian forces while maintaining the United States' role as an offshore balancer would be the most realist thing to do. Your humble correspondent was disinclined to adopt this hypothesis then and tends to disagree even now, and not just because this would require a Machiavellian level of realpolitik sense that Washington – especially under Obama – is completely incapable off.

The problem is not that Washington lacks a strategy, but that it is following two different and at times even opposing strategies simultaneously. The realist in Obama would not have worried about what's going on in the Middle East. If history gives any indication, the Middle East – especially the regions of Iraq and Syria – is correcting for a historical anomaly and mutating away from arbitrary colonial borders created by the British and French toward logical borders that reflect sectarian lines. The Kurds are finally carving out a land of their own, and the entire region of Mesopotamia is being divided into a Shiite southern crescent, with the northern parts of Iraq and Syria that border Turkey becoming a Sunni-dominated zone. Any realist leader wouldn't be too worried if these areas were to undergo their own version of a Thirty Years' War, as this would pose no direct threat to the interests of the United States. The conflict can be contained with proper offshore balancing, minimal interference, and policing of the Mediterranean to contain and discourage the flow of refugees.

But the Obama administration is led by liberal interventionists of the highest order, including Susan Rice and Samantha Powers. That, coupled with twenty-first century morality, a liberal order based on human rights and an upcoming election campaign season in which every failure will be scrutinized, is leading the administration to set unreliable red lines and unachievable short-term goals. Also added to the situation is the dilemma of working side by side with noted adversaries including Bashar al-Assad and Iran even though they share a greater common enemy in the form of Islamic State, thereby forgetting an important historical lesson learned when the U.S. and the West allied with the Soviet Union to defeat Nazism.

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2015-05/23/content_35641674.htm

[KoKo]

10. ????

????? I miss where he's coming from in this article and this caution at the end.

But the Obama administration is led by liberal interventionists of the highest order, including Susan Rice and Samantha Powers. That, coupled with twenty-first century morality, a liberal order based on human rights and an upcoming election campaign season in which every failure will be scrutinized, is leading the administration to set unreliable red lines and unachievable short-term goals. Also added to the situation is the dilemma of working side by side with noted adversaries including Bashar al-Assad and Iran even though they share a greater common enemy in the form of Islamic State, thereby forgetting an important historical lesson learned when the U.S. and the West allied with the Soviet Union to defeat Nazism.

[bemildred]

11. He's saying we need to pick a side.

And because of domestic politics we will likely continue to try to not do that.

The basic issue is that we are not on the same side as our good friends the Saudis in the IS/al Qaeda fight, and we want to ignore that. The general US strategy has been to try to "manage" the conflict, so nobody wins, because we already said Assad must go, and of course we must be obeyed, so he can't win, but we don't want IS or al Nusra to win either. But that has become untenable since the Saudi-Turkey-Egypt axis agreed on taking Assad down, because Iran will fight them all and Russia will back it, and we are just in the process of trying to normalize relations with Iran.

This is what passes for strategic thinking in DC, and you will notice it is all about maintaining appearances.

He did not express himself well in that paragraph.

[bemildred]

12. Yemen Redraws Middle East Alliances

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world, bereft of resources, fractured by tribal divisions and religious sectarianism, and plagued by civil war. And yet this small country tucked into the bottom of the Arabian Peninsula is shattering old alliances and spurring new and surprising ones. As Saudi Arabia continues its air assault on Houthis insurgents, supporters and opponents of the Riyadh monarchy are reconfiguring the political landscape in a way that is unlikely to vanish once the fighting is over.

The Saudi version of the war is that Shiite Iran is trying to take over Sunni Yemen using proxies—the Houthis—to threaten the Kingdom’s southern border and assert control over the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait into the Red Sea. The Iranians claim they have no control over the Houthis, no designs on the Straits, and that the war is an internal matter for the Yeminis to resolve.

The Saudis have constructed what at first glance seems a formidable coalition consisting of the Arab League, the monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Turkey and the US Except that the “coalition” is not as solid as it looks and is more interesting in whom it doesn’t include than whom it does.

Egypt and Turkey are the powerhouses in the alliance, but there is more sound and fury than substance in their support.

http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/30890-yemen-re-draws-middle-east-alliances

[KoKo]

22. Very interesting read...especially in light

of the Houthi's shoot down of the Saudi Fighter jet that was posted here today. However, CNN questions if the report and photos of the downing are correct:

http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/24/middleeast/yemen-houthis-claims-shoot-down-saudi-fighter-jet-airplane/index.html

And this from the Truthout article:

The Iran nuclear agreement has led to what has to be one of the oddest alliances in the region: Israel and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is on the same wavelength as the Netanyahu government when it comes to Iran, and the two are cooperating in trying to torpedo the agreement. According to investigative journalist Robert Perry, the alliance between Tel Aviv and Riyadh was sealed by a secret $16 billion gift from Riyadh to an Israeli “development” account in Europe, some of which has been used to build illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories.

The Saudis and the Israelis are on the same side in the Syrian civil war as well, and, for all Riyadh’s talk about supporting the Palestinians, the only members of the GCC that have given money to help rebuild Gaza after last summer’s Israeli attack on Gaza are Qatar and Kuwait.

How this all falls out in the end is hard to predict, except that it is clear that, for all their financial firepower, the Saudis can’t get the major regional players—Israel excepted—on board. And an alliance with Israel—a country that is more isolated today because of its occupation policies than it has been in its history—is not likely to be very stable.

Long-time Middle East correspondent for the Independent Robert Fisk says the Saudis live in “fear” of the Iranians, the Shiia, the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, US betrayal, Israeli plots, even “themselves, for where else will the revolution start in Sunni Muslim Saudi but among its own royal family?”

[bemildred]

13. Why Obama has come to regret underestimating the Islamic State

Have any words come back to haunt President Obama so much as his description of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant last team as a “JV” - junior varsity - team of terrorists?

This wasn’t al-Qaeda in its 9/11 pomp, he said; just because a university second team wore Manchester United jerseys didn’t make them David Beckham.

How times change. As of this weekend, the JV team is doing a lot better than Manchester United. With its capture of Palmyra, it controls half of Syria.

Its defeat in Kobane - a town of which few non-Kurds had heard - was cheered by the world; its victory in Ramadi last Sunday gives it control of virtually all of Iraq’s largest province, one which reaches to the edge of Baghdad.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11626580/Why-Obama-has-come-to-regret-underestimating-the-Islamic-State.html

[bemildred]

14. Obama's Iraq Failures as Bad (or Worse) Than Bush's

The fall of Ramadi, Iraq’s fourth-largest city, 64 miles from Baghdad, to the vicious terrorists of the so-called Islamic State has renewed interest in an old controversy.

“Knowing what we know now,” invading Iraq was a mistake, say most GOP presidential candidates —including the brother of the president who ordered it.

Many generals thought so at the time. Invading Iraq “was the dumbest thing we ever did,” said retired Marine Gen. James Mattis.

We were right to go into Afghanistan and Iraq, said retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Bolger, but we went wrong when we stayed to “nation build.”

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/05/24/obamas_iraq_failures_as_bad_or_worse_than_bushs_126710.html

[bemildred]

15. Carter: Iraqis showed 'no will to fight' in Ramadi

Washington (CNN)Defense Secretary Ash Carter spoke frankly in an exclusive interview on CNN's "State of the Union" aired Sunday about the weak state of Iraq's military as one major reason the key town of Ramadi fell to ISIS, also known as ISIL, last week.

"What apparently happened was that the Iraqi forces just showed no will to fight," Carter told CNN's Barbara Starr. "They were not outnumbered. In fact, they vastly outnumbered the opposing force, and yet they failed to fight, they withdrew from the site, and that says to me, and I think to most of us, that we have an issue with the will of the Iraqis to fight ISIL and defend themselves."

The U.S. has sped up the shipment of some arms to help boost Iraqi forces as ISIS has recently taken more territory, but the U.S. defense chief said Iraq's military needs to step up.

http://us.cnn.com/2015/05/24/politics/ashton-carter-isis-ramadi/index.html

[bemildred]

16. The War Nerd: Doing the math on Alawite casualty numbers

The Sunday Telegraph said recently that Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA) will collapse soon, because one-third of Syrian Alawite “males of military age” have already died fighting the Sunni. Lack of manpower, the theory goes, will doom the Alawites.

There’s no denying that Assad’s forces have been looking weak lately. Islamic State has been making gains against them in the southeast, taking the only road connecting southern Syria with Iraq. Worse yet, in the minds of artsy Western news-chewers, is the fact that IS has now taken the ancient ruins of Palmyra, raising the terrible specter of bearded hicks taking sledgehammers to “cultural treasures” like they did in the museums of Mosul.

I have to confess, the prospect of Palmyra’s pillars falling down grieves me less than the thought of a brave, smart Kurdish soldier losing her life to the slave-selling pigs of IS. Art, schmart; you can rebuild a fallen temple a lot easier than you can bring back the YPG/J kids whose faces show up on the weekly death notices.

http://pando.com/2015/05/23/the-war-nerd-doing-the-math-on-alawite-casualty-numbers/

[bemildred]

17. The Saudi dilemma

More than 20 people were killed in Saudi Arabia on Friday. The attack happened in the Saudi Eastern Province where Shiites dominate the population. It is the first attack to be claimed by the Saudi branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Similar to elsewhere, ISIL is directly targeting Shiite Muslims.

The timing of the attack is significant, given the recent activism in Saudi foreign policy on Syria. After the accession of the new monarch, King Salman bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia declared Iran's increasing influence in the region a key strategic threat. Accordingly, Iran is now a threat to Saudi Arabia in three zones. The first is Syria, where Saudi Arabia is now actively combatting to defeat the Bashar al-Assad regime.

The second zone is Yemen. Saudi Arabia has organized several air attacks to stop Iran-backed Houthi groups in Yemen, a key geography for Saudi national security. The third zone is the Gulf. Iran's influence in Bahrain, for instance, is again critical for Saudi Arabia. Shiite activism in Bahrain is rapidly affecting the Saudi Eastern Province, where Shiites dominate the population.

In the early phases of the Arab uprising, thousands of Shiites in the Eastern Province protested the Saudi regime. The Saudi regime spent a large amount of money persuading the people there but did not refrain from using organized violence to suppress the rebellions in the Eastern Province.

http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/gokhan-bacik/the-saudi-dilemma_381590.html

[bemildred]

18. Syria regime 'to accept de facto partition' of country

BEIRUT: Weakened by years of war, Syria's government appears ready for the country's de facto partition, defending strategically important areas and leaving much of the country to rebels and jihadists, experts and diplomats say.

The strategy was in evidence last week with the army's retreat from the ancient central city of Palmyra after an advance by the Islamic State group.

"It is quite understandable that the Syrian army withdraws to protect large cities where much of the population is located," said Waddah Abded Rabbo, director of Syria's Al-Watan newspaper, which is close to the regime.

"The world must think about whether the establishment of two terrorist states is in its interests or not," he said, in reference to IS's self-proclaimed "caliphate" in Syria and Iraq, and Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front's plans for its own "emirate" in northern Syria.

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/syria-regime-to-accept-de-facto-partition-of-country/articleshow/47406595.cms

[KoKo]

20. A good read...!

[bemildred]

21. Bowing to necessity.

Assad must be getting good advice. He will last longer if he keeps his ambitions within his means. And this may well lead the takfiris to look around for more lucrative targets.

Perhaps Erdogan will make his move now and take his "buffer zone" in the north. This may lead other people to get ideas too.

[bemildred]

19. US and Iraq trade blame over fall of Ramadi

US Defense Secretary Ash Carter has criticised Iraqi forces for showing no will to fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group during the fall of Ramadi, in comments dismissed as "baseless" by a senior Iraqi legislator.

Carter told CNN's State of the Union programme on Sunday that the Iraqi army failed to take on ISIL despite having a numerical advantage.

"The Iraqi forces just showed no will to fight...they vastly outnumbered the opposing force and yet they withdrew from the site," Carter said.

The comments were rejected by a senior Iraqi lawmaker, Hakim al-Zamili, who said the Pentagon chief's comments were "unrealistic and baseless".

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/iraq-isil-ramadi-anbar-150524100705746.html

Yup, masters of the universe, we are.