I wouldn't expect Trump to be able to answer that. I wouldn't actually have expected Obama to be able to answer that except in vague generalities unless he'd just been briefed and knew he'd be expected to remember the information. It's like asking if you know your 2nd child's 3rd favorite toy's lead content--have you seen the test reports. If you say "yes," that, itself, is a problem.
The companies themselves have done at lot.
The US government has set standards and tests against them.
The energy industry has gone on record saying that the government should do more. Since that means "the government should do more to protect our company's infrastructure," I don't ever see that bit going away. "No, please, don't give us stuff and money to make our infrastructure more robust, no strings attached" is not something I expect anybody to say ever unless they're true die-hard ideologues.
Of course, since there isn't just one set of software and equipment in use, there's not likely going to be a one-size-fits-all solution. But one of the things they hit on a few years ago was taking much of the equipment off line; or, rather, making it part of a separate network, possibly with dedicated connections, that can only be hacked by means of physically digging up the wire and patching into it or by putting a transmitter/receiver in the path of the narrow-beam microwave data transmission.
Which, of course, brings to mind an article I read about two years ago now when a Russian consulate in the NW was shut down: The article predated the shutdown by months and asked why, exactly, it was known that so many Russians with connections to that consulate (the one in SF?) had been observed standing or frequently visiting certain locations throughout the west--locations which, when checked, turned out to be where secure data transmission lines were, the location of data junctions, places where there were high-tension cables or pipelines carrying essential materials. In the desert, at the beach where data cables came onshore, wherever the infrastructure sites were. Were they there just to say, "See? We know where they are?" To say, "Gotta wonder why we're here so much--worried yet?" Or were they actually engaged in something beyond that surface level of spy craft. I mean, if the press knew and had pictures, you'd assume that the US government had some clue. Or maybe the US government didn't have a clue and that was the point--checking to see if the Cracker-Jacks decoder ring had finally arrived in the NSA or FBI's mailbox to help them improve on playing Junior Birdman. (Okay, too many 1930s references in that. Back on topic, Igel!)
Various people on government committees that look after these things say that more needs to be done--but frame that as, "They're always evolving new strategies, we're always changing our interfaces and technologies, so you can never be done." Which is true, but it's sort of a mindless criticism when talking about an open-ended task. Like asking the Superbowl teams on game day if they think they trained enough. Idiots answer "yes," which doesn't actually mean "enough" but subs for "we trained all we could or were about to, so stop trying to make us doubt ourselves."
Some of those people who spoke to reporters are on committees that are interfaced with organizations much of whose work is classified. At that point, you don't want them or Trump to be saying what's being done--if the GRU knows about it, meh. If they don't, why tell them? And if you say the wrong thing, you may point them to where work isn't being done, sort of a big red flashing arrow saying, "Hack here!" That was true in 2015 as in 2017.