Reply #1: What Bull : LWV "does support an individual audit capacity for ..recounts" [View All]

[papau]

http://www.lwv.org/join/elections/hava_dre.html Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines and HAVA Implementation
The possibility of election fraud resulting from the use of DRE voting machines has been a topic of discussion as part of the implementation of the new Help America Vote Act. In an effort to address the concerns that have arisen, the League has considered opinions from all sides of the debate. It has been suggested that DRE machines are inherently subject to fraud unless there is an individual paper record of each vote. This seems extreme. DREs are extremely sophisticated machines and most DREs store information in multiple formats and in multiple places within its program. To tamper with a DRE someone would need to know each and every format and storage capacity and be able to manipulate it undetected. Additionally, it must be remembered that DREs are not an election system unto themselves; they are simply an instrument within a complex election system. The key is to design an overall system that builds in multiple checks making it improbable that the system will be tampered with.


The LWVUS does support an individual audit capacity for the purposes of recounts and authentication of elections for all voting systems, including, but not limited to, DREs. The LWVUS does not believe that an individual paper confirmation for each ballot is required to achieve those goals; in fact this is unnecessary and can be counterproductive. An individual paper confirmation for each ballot would undermine disability access requirements, raise costs, and slow down the purchase or lease of machines that might be needed to replace machines that don't work. Simply because a voter verifies their vote on a piece of paper does not guarantee the same results have been be recorded within the machine and vice versa. And why would we assume that, if the total from a paper count and the total from a machine count are different, the paper count is accurate? Is it not just as easy to tamper with an election by "losing" a couple of paper ballots or miscounting them during a recount? And what about the number of ballots involved? In Florida, in the 2000 presidential election, nearly 6 million votes were cast. Do we really believe that recounting that many paper ballots is more accurate than using certified electronic equipment?


http://www.lwv.org/join/elections/hava_dre_shamos.html
DRE Statement by Michael Shamos PhD, JD, Professor at Carnegie Mellon University, Co-Director, Institute for eCommerce. Computer Expert Opposed to "Voter-Verifiable" Paper Ballot


http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/dbm_search/technology/toc_voting_system_report/votingsystemreportfinal.pdf
Risk Assessment Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System and Processes...Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), an independent IT firm with an international reputation and strength in IT security, was commissioned by Maryland Governor Ehrlich Jr. to provide Maryland with an independent security analysis of Maryland's DRE voting system. SAIC's findings and recommendations support the League's position that DREs can be part of a secure voting system without a voter verified individual ballot paper trail