Reply #70: Once more, do you consider it appropriate to exclude non-productive facilities? [View All]

[kristopher]

I did make a mistake above, the global CF is 79%; it is the US that is at 71%.
"Although reactor vendors claim a 79%, global-average- load factor, this figure excludes early-retirement (poorly performing) plants and reactors’ early years of operation."

That said, when someone builds a nuclear plant, it costs a huge amount of money and it's built with the promise that it will deliver a certain amount of service for that money. When a plant only delivers 25% of that service, how would you suggest that deficiency be accounted for in public discussions on the merits of the technology - especially in discussions where the industry is looking for more public money? Is there somewhere you can point to where the nuclear fission industry highlights the number of plants that have had to shut down early or for more than one year; and at that spot is there an accurate accounting of what the total associated costs were of those shutdowns? Where are those costs factored into the price the industry quotes for nuclear fission derived electricity?

I've removed the references from these paragraphs for ease of reading. The link to download the entire paper (includes the paragraphs with references) follow.

Trimming Nuclear Costs by Inflating Reactor Load Factors and Lifetimes
A third nuclear-cost-trimming strategy in a majority of the 30 studies is overestimating reactor lifetimes and nuclear-load or capacity factors (or plant output-percentages, compared to 100% output). For instance, the WNA report claims (pp. 21, 10) that nuclear plants "can offer electricity at predictable low and stable costs for up to 60 years of operating life," and that "capacity factors of nuclear plants around the world have increased....Levels of 90% and above have been achieved by many plants in Europe and Asia for many years". Likewise the 2009 MIT study presupposes (p. 18) a "capacity factor of 85%". Yet what do actual empirical data say about current reactor lifetimes and nuclear-load factors?

If one assumes perfect plant components, routine refueling/maintenance, and flawless performance, at best reactors can achieve very-short-term, 90% load factors. During the first 30 years of US-commercial-fission experience (beginning in the 1950s), proponents say nuclear-load-factor averages were 50%. With more reactors than other nations, the US has 104 plants. Nuclear proponents say their lifetime-load-factor average is 71%. UK load factors are similar. Only 7 global reactors (1.7% of 414)—mostly those with lax design/standards/enforcement in developing nations—have ever eliminated original "bugs," then later achieved short-term, 90% load factors. Although reactor vendors claim a 79%, global-average- load factor, this figure excludes early-retirement (poorly performing) plants and reactors’ early years of operation.

Rather than 71 or 79%, however, most nuclear-cost studies, like the WNA and MIT analyses assume 85–95% nuclear-load factors, a lifetime-fleet average never achieved by any nation. When the pro-nuclear MIT (see later discussion) and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission studies recently reported US-nuclear-load factors of "about 90%," they admitted this figure covered only the last 5 years, included no new plants, and ignored lifetime-average data and early-shutdown reactors, all of which reveal the correct, lifetime-load average to about 70%. Obviously assessors should use national, lifetime-load averages, not short-term load factors, and neither those for the highest-performing reactors (that likely have deferred maintenance), nor those for the lowest-performing reactors (e.g., 14% load factor for the Fort St. Vrain, Colorado, reactor).
pg 6,7

http://nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs
First paper for download, its titled "Climate Change, Nuclear Economics, and Conflicts of Interest," Science and Engineering Ethics, 17:75-107. 2011

Part of the problem is the long lived nature of nuclear plants. Obtaining lifetime data for a plant expected to last between 40-100 years takes time and necessitates assumptions while that data is being gathered. The assumptions of the nuclear industry and their uncritical mouthpieces at institutions like MIT are entirely designed to promote business interests, they are not fair representations of the body of evidence available. While improvements have been been made that predict higher capacity factors, there are enough OTHER issues still extant to make the case for a more cautious predictive approach than we have seen from the industry.

In other words, a sales pitch isn't science.