Reply #72: That naturalism proclaims human consciousness is the result [View All]

[Jim__]

of blind, accidental chance is a misstatement of the usual naturalist position


Taylor discusses this example within the general context of human
rationality: how is human consciousness any different from the
accumulation of accidental markings upon a stone? Perhaps, given
enough time, nature is bound to evolve something as marvelous and
astonishing as human consciousness. But we cannot have it both ways,
says Taylor. We simply cannot consistently claim that human
consciousness is both the chance outcome of blind, accidental causes
and a reliable belief-forming apparatus by which we discern truths
about the world.

The forms of naturalism that I am familiar with hold that human consciousness arises, not out of "blind chance", but out of chance coupled with natural selection; i.e. while the initial change is random, the survivor is selected (statistically) by how well he fits his environment. A, say lifeform, that can detect what is going on in its environment, and react to this in such a way as to improve its chance of survival, has a selective advantage over one that can't. So, ultimately, the lifeforms that survive are those that discern the truth about the world. This does a fair job of explaining why humans, the result of eons of natural selection, can detect certain truths about the world.

Yet, how could we ever come to know (via accidentally-caused
belief-forming faculties) that our belief-forming faculties are the
result of blind, accidental causes?...

Well, first, as stated above, the premise is wrong.

...In order to achieve this
certainty, it seems human consciousness would require the ability to
"step outside" or otherwise transcend the blind, accidental nature of
the system in order to objectively evaluate that system. But this is
just what naturalism denies: nothing transcends the system.

Actually, since human consciousness had the chance to evolve precisely because the human brain could know certain truths about the world, it is not that surprising that it can know certain truths about itself, a part of the world.

... It is not clear how these could be a
contingent, expansionary function of matter; but yet the naturalist
must somehow maintain that they are. Wouldn't it just be better to
admit that some features of the world do not seem to be subject to
change or the result of blind, accidental causes? ...

Once again the basic premise is wrong.

...Quite frankly, there
doesn't seem to be anything foundational enough within the landscape
of naturalism upon which to establish the unchangeableness of things
like number, or justice. For, according to evolutionary theory,
everything is subject to change, to progress -- except for,
apparently, the doctrine of naturalism itself.

That's a somewhat amazing statement. Our beliefs about the world change all the time. As we learn more and more about nature, we come to a better understanding of the "how" and "why" of change; and the understanding of naturalistic processes are changing all the time. Today, we have an understanding of how selection allows, let's say, life forms, to improve. Tomorrow, we may come to know and understand the steps that brought about human consciousness. You may claim that the basic premise of materialism doesn't change; but, materialism has proven a fertile assumption as a basis for learning about the world. If we reach the point where it is no longer a useful assumption, then we will have reason to re-examine it.

As a matter of fact, I think one of the strong arguments for the naturalist approach is that it allows us to learn, and to change our ideas based on learning. What I find so disturbing about a position that all difficult problems can be resolved by postulating some "other" phantasmagorical realm and claim that all difficulties are magically resolved there, is that it condemns us to a a state of perpetual ignorance; or, to a self-proclaimed, but untested (and untestable) omniscience.